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நீதி · Fed renovation

Fed Review Finds No Criminal Referral Grounds. Trump Still Wants Powell Out

The watchdog documented failed cost controls and years of delay, but found no grounds for a criminal referral. Trump still demanded Powell’s resignation.

எழுத்து வடிவம் 7 நிமிட வாசிப்பு · 162 ஆதாரங்கள்

HeyDex

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The Federal Reserve’s watchdog found serious failures in its headquarters renovation—but no grounds for a criminal referral against Jerome Powell or anyone else. Donald Trump responded by demanding Powell’s resignation anyway. A report documenting how costs escaped control became another occasion to seek the removal of an official whose criminal wrongdoing it did not substantiate.⁠5⁠6

That distinction is the central finding of Inspector General Michael Horowitz’s evaluation: expensive mismanagement is established; criminal wrongdoing and administrative misconduct were not found. The institution responsible for monetary policy failed to secure the cost certainty its own construction contract was supposed to deliver. Neither that failure nor the size of the bill is, by itself, evidence of a crime.⁠5

“At no point during our evaluation did we find reasonable grounds to believe that a violation of federal criminal law had occurred requiring a referral to the U.S. Attorney General in accordance with the Inspector General Act,” the evaluation states. It adds: “We did not identify administrative misconduct during our evaluation.” Those conclusions are not a court verdict, an endorsement of every project decision or a resolution of every conceivable legal issue.⁠5

The review followed Powell’s July 2025 request and lasted more than a year. Its September 29, 2026 printed date and September 30 public release refer to one evaluation, not two. The official document has 120 numbered pages, despite some public descriptions of 121.⁠5⁠14

$1.317bnApproved renovation budget, February 2020 5
$2.381bnApproved renovation budget, December 2024 5
December 2027Revised construction completion projection, not a guarantee 5

A price ceiling that never arrived

The project covers the Eccles and 1951 headquarters buildings in Washington. Construction began in July 2022; the original plan anticipated ending the construction phase in the second quarter of 2024. The revised projection is December 2027. Meanwhile, the approved renovation budget rose from $1.317 billion to $2.381 billion, with the latter still approved as of August 2026. Within those totals, construction increased from $921 million to $2.018 billion. These are budgets, not amounts already paid.⁠5

Public price tags need care. Bloomberg reported $2.4 billion, CBS used $2.5 billion and PBS described nearly $2.5 billion. A separate, broader multicycle capital budget reached $2.455 billion in 2024; the Fed’s public explanation later cited approximately $2.46 billion. Different scopes and rounding help explain the range, but do not definitively reconcile the basis and date of every published figure. The exact renovation line is the more useful measure here.⁠119⁠8⁠120⁠5⁠137

The Board chose a construction-manager-at-risk contract, an arrangement intended to transfer meaningful cost risk to the manager and establish a guaranteed maximum price. Instead, the watchdog found that the Board “repeatedly deviated from its cost-management provisions.” By July 2026, four years after construction began, it still had not transferred material risk, obtained cost certainty or established an overall ceiling.⁠5

An early constraint was effectively discarded. The project team gave the architecture and engineering firm an $857 million design cost limitation in April 2020, distinct from the approved construction budget. It was neither updated nor enforced, and neither the construction manager nor the owner’s representative was told of it. The representative also lacked budget and detailed bidding information needed for independent cost validation.⁠5

Between July 2022 and December 2025, the Board awarded 69 subcontractor work packages totaling $1.978 billion before formally requesting a guaranteed maximum price on December 30, 2025. Those were construction awards—not manager fees or cash disbursements. The manager submitted a $2.135 billion construction-cost proposal in January 2026. That was a late contractor estimate and price-ceiling proposal, not the Board’s first total budget: an approved budget had existed since February 2020.⁠5

The manager’s fee remained 2.95 percent of work rather than a fixed, capped fee. Responsibility for cost and schedule was unclear, and package increases exceeding $100 million were not adequately escalated. In practical terms, the Board kept committing work without establishing the project-wide protection it had contracted to obtain.⁠5

Mechanical, electrical and plumbing work shows the scale. Two core-and-shell packages estimated at $178 million in March 2022 were awarded for $539 million in July and October 2023; each received two bids. Two interior systems packages rose from a $28 million estimate to $155 million in June 2025 awards. Together, the four totaled approximately $694 million, about $488 million above the earlier estimate.⁠5

Inflation was a factor, but not a sufficient explanation. The watchdog compared those periods with producer-price increases of approximately 16 percent and 19 percent—far below the package increases. Those indexes are not a precise calculation of this project’s inflation exposure, and the Board supplied no project-specific analysis. A January 2023 shift from predominantly open workspaces to predominantly closed offices also delayed interior design completion by 21 months.⁠5

The evaluation rejected another prominent explanation: marble, water features, the garden terrace, a private elevator for the chair and skylights “did not materially contribute” to construction-cost increases. That does not mean every feature was absent or free. It means the main accountability questions concern contract controls, bidding, design decisions and governance—not simply conspicuous finishes.⁠5⁠8

The criminal inquiry was already closed

The inspector general’s evaluation was separate from the Justice Department inquiry into the renovation and Powell’s June 2025 Senate Banking Committee testimony. At a March 3, 2026 hearing, prosecutor George A. Massucco-LaTaif was asked what evidence existed of renovation fraud or criminal misconduct. “We do not know at this time,” he answered, according to reporting on the unsealed transcript.⁠126

Chief U.S. District Judge James E. Boasberg quashed the subpoenas in an opinion dated March 11 and unsealed March 13. “The Government has offered no evidence whatsoever that Powell committed any crime other than displeasing the President,” he wrote. He also found extensive evidence that the subpoenas were intended to pressure Powell into supporting lower interest rates or resigning.⁠118⁠52

On April 24, U.S. Attorney Jeanine Pirro said she had directed her office to close the investigation while the inspector general conducted the review, reserving a restart if facts warranted it. The June 11 court opinion recorded: “Instead of appealing, the Government closed its investigation.” It denied the government’s attempt to vacate the subpoena opinion. Blocking subpoenas and closing the inquiry were successive events, not conflicting outcomes; no indictment had issued.⁠122⁠112

Powell’s chair term ended in May, when Kevin M. Warsh became chair, but Powell remained a governor. On September 30, Trump said Powell “should be forced to resign” or face a government lawsuit for “either corruption or incompetence.” He asked Attorney General Todd Blanche to study the evaluation and determine a response. Trump’s description of a project with “no end in sight” omitted the report’s December 2027 projection, though that date is not guaranteed.⁠14⁠156⁠5

Pirro’s office said it was reviewing the newly received report. Review is not an announced reopening. Through October 1, no public filing established a formal restart, and no new charges were established. That is the limit of the public record, not a guarantee about prosecutors’ next decision.⁠14⁠6⁠112

Accountability now needs measurable results

The Board accepted seven recommendations: obtain a guaranteed maximum price or another best-value completion approach; set cost and schedule metrics; establish the manager’s fee under the contract; clarify oversight and reporting; audit awarded costs; reconcile contracted services with those received and assess reimbursement; and standardize oversight of future major initiatives.⁠5

In his September 29 response, Warsh retained the General Services Administration as project executive, effective immediately, reporting to him and the Board. That is oversight of remaining work, not a transfer of Fed ownership. He committed to promptly completing price-ceiling negotiations, establishing fixed budget and schedule measures, and hiring an independent auditor to “verify the accuracy and compliance of all awarded costs to date.” No fixed completion deadline for that audit or the price negotiations was established.⁠16⁠14

With GSA, the Board also intends to value services not received and pursue remedies, potentially reimbursement or credits. No recovery has been established. The inspector general plans quarterly follow-up until the recommendations are addressed. The useful test now is whether the Board obtains a real ceiling, validates costs, recovers anything owed and delivers against defined measures. A resignation demand answers none of those questions.⁠16⁠44

Sources and supporting reference material

Broadcast accounts and initial reporting:⁠1⁠2⁠3⁠4

Evaluation, contemporary reporting and related coverage:⁠5⁠6⁠7⁠8⁠9⁠10⁠11⁠12⁠13⁠14⁠15⁠16⁠17⁠18⁠19⁠20⁠21⁠22⁠23⁠24⁠25⁠26⁠27⁠28⁠29

Inquiry coverage and background references:⁠30⁠31⁠32⁠33⁠34⁠35⁠36⁠37⁠38⁠39⁠40⁠41⁠42⁠43⁠44⁠45⁠46⁠47⁠48⁠49⁠50⁠51⁠52⁠53⁠54⁠55⁠56⁠57⁠58⁠59⁠60⁠61⁠62⁠63⁠64⁠65⁠66⁠67⁠68⁠69

Additional reference material, not all relied upon for article claims:⁠70⁠71⁠72⁠73⁠74⁠75⁠76⁠77⁠78⁠79⁠80⁠81⁠82⁠83⁠84⁠85⁠86⁠87⁠88⁠89⁠90⁠91⁠92⁠93⁠94⁠95⁠96⁠97⁠98⁠99⁠100⁠101⁠102⁠103⁠104⁠105⁠106⁠107⁠108⁠109

Court records, inquiry reporting and release-day coverage:⁠110⁠111⁠112⁠113⁠114⁠115⁠116⁠117⁠118⁠119⁠120⁠121⁠122⁠123⁠124⁠125⁠126

Further supporting and background references, not all relied upon for article claims:⁠127⁠128⁠129⁠130⁠131⁠132⁠133⁠134⁠135⁠136⁠137⁠138⁠139⁠140⁠141⁠142⁠143⁠144⁠145⁠146⁠147⁠148⁠149⁠150⁠151⁠152⁠153⁠154⁠155⁠156⁠157⁠158⁠159⁠160⁠161⁠162

ஆதாரங்கள்95

இங்கு மேற்கோள் காட்டப்பட்ட ஆதாரங்களில், Office of Inspector General, U.S. Department of Commerce முதலில் வெளியிட்டது; அது இந்தச் செய்தி ஒளிபரப்பாவதற்கு 6 நாட்கள் முன்பு. அதன் பின் மேலும் 31 ஊடகங்கள் வெளியிட்டன.
  1. Office of Inspector General, U.S. Department of Commerce
  2. U.S. Department of Homeland Security
  3. FDIC OIG
  4. fhfaoig.gov
  5. X (formerly Twitter)
  6. CBS News
  7. KTVZ
  8. IEX.nl
  9. +மேலும் 24 ஊடகங்கள்
  10. HeyDay News

பின்னணிக்காகப் படிக்கப்பட்ட 26 பழைய செய்திகள்.தேதி குறிப்பிடப்படாத 51 ஊடகங்கள்:Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve SystemReutersArcaMaxCourtListenerjustia.comUnnamed channel

அனைத்து ஆதாரங்களும், ஊடகம் வாரியாக

95 ஊடகங்களிலிருந்து 162 ஆதாரங்கள்· அதிகம் மேற்கோள் காட்டப்பட்டவை முதலில்

ஒளிபரப்பானபடி
  1. Donald Trump demanded Powell’s resignation despite a renovation review finding no grounds for criminal referral. The Federal Reserve’s headquarters construction is projected to finish in December 2027, years after its original target, without a finalized guaranteed maximum price. What failed to control the costs, and what accountability remains unfinished?
  2. The evaluation also identified no administrative misconduct by Powell or other officials. That distinction matters: management and oversight failures contributed to escalating costs, but the review did not substantiate the criminal or administrative-misconduct accusations. This is not a court verdict, an endorsement of every project decision, or a resolution of every conceivable legal issue. The evaluation is dated September 29, 2026, and was publicly announced September 30. Those are different dates for one evaluation. It has 120 numbered pages, not the 121 described in some public accounts. The investigation lasted more than a year, following Jerome Powell’s July 2025 request for a review of the Eccles and 1951 headquarters buildings in Washington.
  3. The approved renovation budget rose from 1.317 billion dollars in February 2020 to 2.381 billion in December 2024. That later amount remained approved as of August 2026. Inside those totals, the construction component increased from 921 million dollars to 2.018 billion. A separate, broader multicycle capital budget increased from 1.378 billion to 2.455 billion dollars. These are different scopes, not interchangeable price tags. None establishes how much cash has already been paid.
  4. Public cost descriptions range from 2.4 billion dollars to 2.5 billion, or nearly 2.5 billion. The Fed’s public explanation later used approximately 2.46 billion. The renovation line is close to the rounded 2.4 billion description; the broader capital figure is close to 2.5 billion. Scope and rounding help explain the range, but the basis and date behind every published figure remain only partly reconciled. Choosing one headline number would hide that uncertainty.
  5. Construction began in July 2022. The February 2020 plan expected the construction phase to finish in the second quarter of 2024. The revised projection is December 2027—not a guaranteed completion date.
  6. The contract was supposed to place meaningful cost risk on the construction manager and establish a guaranteed maximum price. The Board selected this construction-manager-at-risk approach after difficulties with a different contracting approach on its Martin building project. But it repeatedly departed from the new contract’s cost-management provisions. Internal governance was inadequate for the project’s scale and complexity, and available cost-control actions went unused. The Board hired the construction manager as constructor in March 2022, after two design phases, then began construction without that manager’s project-level estimate. By July 2026, four years after work began, material risk still had not been transferred to the manager, cost certainty had not been obtained, and no overall ceiling had been established. The guaranteed maximum price remained unfinished at the evaluation.
  7. The Board awarded 69 subcontractor work packages totaling 1.978 billion dollars between July 2022 and December 2025 before formally requesting a guaranteed maximum price. That award total excludes approximately 1.49 million dollars in preconstruction services. It is awarded construction work—not construction-manager fees and not a cash-disbursement total. The formal price request came on December 30, 2025. In January 2026, the manager submitted a proposed construction cost of 2.135 billion dollars, including 2.078 billion in awarded construction costs and estimates for remaining work across 84 packages. This was the manager’s construction-cost and price-ceiling proposal, not the Board’s first total project budget. The approved total budget had existed since February 2020.
  8. An 857-million-dollar design limitation had also gone unenforced. The project team conveyed it to the architecture and engineering firm in April 2020, but did not update it or require the firm to design to it. Neither the construction manager nor the owner’s representative was told of the limitation. It was distinct from the approved 921-million-dollar construction budget. The owner’s representative also lacked the project budget and detailed bid information needed for independent cost validation. Meanwhile, the manager’s fee remained 2.95 percent of work rather than a fixed, capped fee. Numerous limited-scope awards without a project-wide guaranteed price made the arrangement resemble cost reimbursement instead of an effective transfer of overall cost risk. Those financial incentives and contract failures are not themselves a finding of a federal crime. Responsibility for cost and schedule was unclear. Increases exceeding 100 million dollars on individual packages were not adequately escalated, and the owner’s representative was not asked to independently validate building-systems packages running approximately 500 million above the earlier design estimate.
  9. Two core-and-shell mechanical, electrical and plumbing packages rose from a 178-million-dollar estimate in March 2022 to 539 million in awards in July and October 2023. Using underlying unrounded figures, the increase was 362 million dollars, or 203 percent. Each package received two bids, not three. Two interior fit-out systems packages rose from a 28-million-dollar estimate to 155 million awarded in June 2025—a reported 454 percent increase. Together, the four packages totaled approximately 694 million dollars, about 488 million, or 237 percent, above the earlier estimate. Three of the four lacked three bids; those three totaled 624 million dollars. Within the systems work, plumbing and heating, ventilation and air-conditioning costs rose from 107 million to 346 million dollars. These comparisons overlap. Adding them together would double-count costs.
  10. Inflation contributed, but it did not explain those increases by itself. Producer-price inflation was approximately 16 percent from March 2022 to October 2023, and 19 percent through June 2025—far below the package increases. Those indexes are comparisons, not a precise measurement of inflation’s effect on this particular project. The Board supplied no project-specific inflation analysis. Both inflation and management problems contributed.
  11. A shift to predominantly closed offices delayed interior design completion by 21 months. Drawings developed from 2019 through 2022 assumed predominantly open workspaces. The Board’s January 2023 decision required changes to walls, doors, security, ceiling spaces and building-systems distribution.
  12. The redesign continued through October 2024, delaying substantial design completion and guaranteed-maximum-price negotiations planned for fall 2023. Building-information-model coordination for the 1951 building extended to October 2025. Eccles coordination remained incomplete in the construction manager’s price-proposal narrative. But conspicuous design features were not material drivers of the construction-cost increases: marble, water features, the garden terrace, a private elevator for the chair and skylights. That does not establish that every feature was absent or cost nothing. It places the major accountability questions with bidding, design decisions, contract controls and governance.
  13. The separate criminal investigation was closed—not merely blocked by a judge. It concerned the renovation and Powell’s June 2025 Senate Banking Committee testimony. Powell disclosed grand-jury subpoenas in January 2026. D.C. U.S. Attorney Jeanine Pirro pursued the inquiry. At a March 3 hearing, prosecutor George A. Massucco-LaTaif could not identify evidence of renovation fraud or criminal misconduct. He argued that a 1.2-billion-dollar overrun supplied reason to investigate and that a tip or rumor could justify inquiry. That figure was a prosecutorial argument, not an audited accounting measure or evidence of a crime.
  14. Chief U.S. District Judge James E. Boasberg quashed the subpoenas in an opinion dated March 11 and unsealed March 13. The justifications were thin and unsubstantiated, with essentially zero evidence to suspect Powell of a crime. The court identified extensive evidence that the subpoenas were intended to pressure Powell into supporting lower interest rates or resigning. The concern was criminal investigative machinery being used against a central-bank official over interest rates and his position—not a construction bill establishing wrongdoing.
  15. Pirro closed the investigation on April 24 while the inspector general conducted the evaluation, reserving the option to restart if facts warranted it. Blocking subpoenas and closing an investigation were successive events, not contradictory accounts. The June 11 court decision recorded that the government closed its investigation instead of appealing, despite earlier declarations that it would appeal. The court also denied the government’s attempt to erase the subpoena opinion on mootness grounds. Closure was a prosecutorial decision, not dismissal of an indictment; none had issued.
  16. The closure removed Senator Thom Tillis’s block on Kevin M. Warsh’s confirmation. Warsh became Fed chair in May 2026 after Powell’s chair term ended, while Powell remained a governor. That continuing Board service explains why Trump still sought Powell’s resignation after the chairmanship changed. On September 30, Trump demanded that Powell resign or face a United States government lawsuit for corruption or incompetence. He asked Attorney General Todd Blanche to study the evaluation and determine a response. Trump characterized the project as costing at least 2.5 billion dollars with no end in sight. The exact approved renovation budget was 2.381 billion, and the evaluation did identify a December 2027 construction projection, though not a guaranteed finish. Pirro’s office was reviewing the evaluation. Review is not an announced reopening, and Blanche’s instruction to study it did not bring a case. As of October 1, no public filing established that the investigation had formally reopened, and no new charges were established. That limits what is publicly known; it does not guarantee what prosecutors will decide next.
  17. The Board accepted all seven corrective recommendations. They require negotiating a guaranteed maximum price or identifying another route to best value; establishing cost and schedule success measures; and setting the construction manager’s fee as the contract provides. Governance must assign an oversight body to monitor those measures, clarify responsibility, authority and accountability, and establish reporting to the Board and its relevant oversight committee. The contract’s audit clause should be exercised to validate all awarded costs, including construction, allowances, contingencies, manager fees and savings. Contractor and owner’s-representative requirements must be reconciled with services actually received, with reimbursement assessed for services paid for but not delivered. Future major initiatives need a standardized framework and agency policy, including criteria for oversight committees, documented duties, and senior Board or Federal Reserve System members who do not themselves manage the project.
  18. Warsh retained the General Services Administration as project executive, effective immediately, in his September 29 response. It reports to him and the Board and oversees the remaining work; that is executive and advisory project oversight, not a transfer of Fed ownership. Warsh committed to promptly completing guaranteed-maximum-price negotiations, setting fixed budget and schedule measures with the project executive, and hiring an independent auditor to verify the accuracy and compliance of all awarded costs to date. With GSA, the Board will review contracts, determine the value of services not received, and pursue appropriate remedies, potentially reimbursement or credits. No recovery has yet been established. Warsh committed to systematic implementation and accountability, prudent use of public funds, and efficient, transparent completion. The answer to the opening question is concrete: the price ceiling, independent cost validation and clear managerial accountability were missing. The evaluation produced no grounds for criminal referral and no administrative-misconduct finding. The separate criminal inquiry was closed, with restart reserved, and reviewing this evaluation did not itself reopen it. Whether the Board obtains a real ceiling, validates costs, recovers any amount owed and meets defined completion measures remains unfinished. The inspector general plans quarterly follow-up until all recommendations are addressed. No fixed calendar deadline has been established for completing the independent audit or finalizing the guaranteed maximum price.

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