South Korea Splits Prosecutors’ Powers, but the Handover Is Unfinished

For decades, South Korea’s prosecution system faced a fundamental criticism: the people deciding whether to bring criminal charges also controlled investigations, concentrating power that critics said was sometimes used for political ends. On October 2, 2026, the country put a different arrangement into operation. Prosecutors lost their ordinary direct-investigation authority. But the agency taking over specified serious-crime investigations opened without a permanent chief, with recruitment and essential systems unfinished. ^{1 8}

The Serious Crime Investigation Agency and the restructured Prosecution Service replaced the former prosecutors’ organization, including the Supreme Prosecutors’ Office, after 78 years. Their launch marks a substantial redistribution of authority—not yet proof that cases will move more fairly or efficiently through the institutions now sharing responsibility for them. ^{2 11}

The clearest readiness gap is staffing. Herald Business reported on October 1 that 1,900 of the investigation agency’s planned 2,874 positions had been filled. That leaves 974 vacancies, or approximately 33.9 percent of its intended workforce. This is the latest explicit pre-launch count, not an independently updated opening-day tally. ²¹

Those exact figures support NHK’s rounded description of an agency about two-thirds staffed. The recruitment framework envisaged police personnel and lawyers filling remaining posts, but no verified deadline establishes when the agency will reach full strength. ^{1 4}

The general division is straightforward. The new agency investigates specified major offenses. Police handle ordinary criminal investigations, such as assaults and thefts. The Prosecution Service evaluates the evidence, decides whether to indict and conducts courtroom prosecution. The Corruption Investigation Office for High-ranking Officials also remains an investigative institution; the reform does not give the new agency exclusive control of every serious case. Precise rules governing overlapping cases are not established in the available reporting. ^{1 11}

Implementation reporting identifies six major-crime categories within the agency’s remit: corruption, economic crime, defense-industry crime, drug crime, insurrection and foreign aggression, and cybercrime. It additionally identifies an offense described as distortion of the law, known in Korean as 법왜곡죄. Its exact statutory elements are not established here. ¹⁷

The agency is also assigned supplementary investigations involving seven categories of crimes against vulnerable people, including child abuse and sexual offenses. The complete list is unavailable. Crucially, that function belongs to the investigation agency: it is not evidence of a permanent exception allowing prosecutors to resume their own direct investigations. Prosecutors can instead request supplementary investigation or reinvestigation by police. ¹⁷

There is, however, a temporary qualification to claims that every prosecutor stopped every investigation immediately. Korean Yonhap reporting describes legislation allowing selected existing investigations to continue for up to 90 days, including June 3 local-election cases approaching limitation deadlines. The full qualifying-case rules and the period’s starting point are not established. This is a reported carryover provision, not a universal deadline, a permanent restoration of investigative authority or a measurement of processing delays. ¹²

Prosecutors retain substantial responsibilities beyond charging: sentence enforcement, victim protection, recovery of criminal proceeds and public-interest representation. Their service removed 42 direct-investigation departments and converted functions into 29 major-crime prosecution departments, while creating departments to review police decisions not to refer cases. The 42 and 29 count different functions, not a like-for-like staffing reduction. ¹⁴

They also retain a role in seeking detention warrants, with suspect interviews before those requests described in implementation reporting. That does not itself establish unrestricted investigative authority or power to personally execute compulsory investigative measures. The distinction matters: separating investigation from prosecution does not mean removing prosecutors from every consequential step before trial. ¹⁴

Both successor institutions opened without permanent chiefs, although acting leadership was reported. That is a serious leadership gap, but not an absence of all management. Kim Ji-yong, also rendered Kim Jiyong, remains the nominee to become the investigation agency’s inaugural chief. ^{8 19}

President Lee Jae-myung approved the request for a parliamentary confirmation hearing on October 1, according to October 2 SBS reporting. Lee said he would make his final appointment decision after the hearing. No hearing or appointment date is established. Approval of a hearing request is not parliamentary approval of an appointment; the available statutory evidence does not resolve whether an affirmative Assembly consent vote or favorable hearing outcome is legally required. ^{20 30}

Reporting describes opposition to Kim from ruling-party hardliners and concerns or allegations about him. The presidential office maintained that the allegations were not sufficiently grave to deny him an opportunity to explain himself. Their underlying substance is not specified in the verified material, and neither their truth nor their role as the sole cause of the delay is established. ^{18 23}

Jeon Jong-min, the agency’s deputy chief or vice administrator, delivered launch remarks, while Choi Jae-min was selected to head its Seoul office. Neither position makes its holder the permanent agency chief. The available accounts do not expressly identify Jeon as acting chief or conclusively name the acting heads of both institutions. ^{29 31 8}

The launch was not an overnight administrative improvisation. Government preparation material dates the Government Organization Act amendment to October 2025 and the successor institutions’ governing laws to March 2026. The National Assembly passed 51 follow-up bills on September 17, and 126 presidential decrees were revised ahead of abolition. These milestones establish substantial preparation, though not the precise statutory commencement clause or completion of every operational requirement. ^{13 6 3}

Interior and Safety Vice Minister Kim Min-jae delivered an August 4 preparation briefing; Minister Yun Ho-jung attended the October 2 launch ceremony and plaque unveiling in Seoul. The ministry’s involvement, and its minister’s recommendation of Kim for chief, do not substitute for a verified statutory account of each successor institution’s ministerial placement and oversight powers. Those legal details remain incompletely established. ^{13 9 30}

More immediate obstacles concern premises and computers. Seoul Economic Daily reported continuing construction at the agency’s headquarters and Seoul office, with completion described as early next year—early 2027, not an exact contractual deadline. Computer-system problems were hampering transfers of prosecution cases, and a connection to the police KICS network had not been established. Warrants might have to be filed on paper; that was a possibility, not confirmation that every warrant was already being handled manually. ²⁹

Case-processing delays have been widely reported, but the evidence supplies no defensible national backlog total, average delay, before-and-after comparison or count of overdue cases. Vacancies and transfer problems are concrete constraints. They do not establish how much delay each caused, whether the reform caused all existing delays or how long any individual case will take. ^{1 29}

That test remains unfinished. Permanent appointments, recruitment, reliable case transfers and functioning police-system links are still unresolved. The reform has changed who holds authority. Its next obligation is to make that division work without leaving people’s cases stranded between the bodies responsible for investigating and prosecuting them.

NHK WORLD-JAPAN: reform and launch report, October 2. ¹

Yonhap: successor institutions begin operating. ²

Asia Business Daily: 126 presidential-decree revisions. ³

Herald Business: workforce framework and vulnerable-victim functions. ⁴

Asia Business Daily: inaugural chief nominee’s tasks. ⁵

NOCUTNEWS: 51 follow-up bills passed. ⁶

Asia Business Daily: investigation and prosecution responsibilities. ⁷

Herald Business: launch without permanent chiefs. ⁸

Yonhap: launch ceremony photographs. ⁹

SBS: successor institutions’ launch. ¹⁰

Korea Times: abolition after 78 years. ¹¹

Korean Yonhap: transition arrangements and carryover investigations. ¹²

Government policy briefing: agency preparations. ¹³

Financial News: Prosecution Service departments and functions. ¹⁴

Yonhap: August cabinet approval of investigative-power revisions. ¹⁵

Financial News: investigation agency’s launch and readiness. ¹⁶

Financial News: investigative jurisdiction and procedural changes. ¹⁷

Asia Business Daily: hearing-request approval. ¹⁸

Herald Business: Kim Ji-yong’s nominee remarks. ¹⁹

SBS: confirmation-hearing request. ²⁰

Herald Business: pre-launch staffing and senior posts. ²¹

Yonhap: chief nominee photographs. ²²

Asia Business Daily: presidential approach to Kim’s appointment. ²³

SBS: leadership vacancies and presidential-office position. ²⁴

Seoul Economic Daily: chief nominee’s reform pledge. ²⁵

Korea Herald: parliamentary hearing request. ²⁶

Korea JoongAng Daily: launch and readiness gaps. ²⁷

Yonhap: request for nominee’s confirmation hearing. ²⁸

Seoul Economic Daily: premises, systems and senior roles. ²⁹

NewsPim: Lee’s post-hearing appointment decision. ³⁰

CHOSUNBIZ: Jeon Jong-min’s launch remarks. ³¹