Ruka hadi kwenye maudhui
Sasa

Migogoro · Saudi airport attacksHabari inayoendelea · ripoti 1 kati ya 4

Three Killed at Saudi Airports as Fresh Attacks Disrupt Riyadh Flights

Saudi authorities document three civilian deaths and 36 injuries in October 6–7 airport attacks. Fresh blasts and widespread flight disruption show the exchange has not ended.

Imeandikwa Dakika 6 za kusoma · Vyanzo 178

HeyDex

Inapatikana kwa Kiingereza

Ufuatiliaji wa ripoti yetu iliyopita

  1. The cause of the Riyadh fire, any damage at Khurais, and whether the Saudi government or Aramco will say anything on damage.

    Bado hakijajibiwa

    The October 3 fire’s cause remains unestablished, and no Saudi or Aramco confirmation of Khurais damage has been established. The new airport accounting does not resolve those oil-facility questions.⁠145⁠78

  2. Whether the claimed gains around Dhubab and the strait are real or will last, and what the offensive has cost in lives.

    Bado hakijajibiwa

    Coastal gains remain disputed and independently unconfirmed. The government’s claim of 1,860 Houthi personnel “neutralised” is not a verified death toll.⁠31⁠32⁠150

  3. Whether the 70-plus Taiz toll and the encirclement are confirmed beyond sources cited by AFP.

    Bado hakijajibiwa

    Independent confirmation beyond the original combatant-linked casualty accounts remains lacking. Reporting still differs on whether Taiz is encircled or facing an attempt at encirclement.⁠33⁠143⁠122

  4. Any Saudi or Aramco statement on damage, and independent confirmation of control around Dhubab and the strait.

    Bado hakijajibiwa

    Neither an established Saudi or Aramco oil-damage statement nor independent confirmation of durable control around Dhubab and the strait has emerged.⁠145⁠31⁠32

  5. Whether the Riyadh meeting of Saudi, Pakistani and Turkish officials produces any step toward de-escalation.

    Kimejibiwa

    The meeting produced movement toward military support, not a demonstrated halt to attacks. Further missile exchanges continued, while Turkey’s ratification and actual contributions remained unresolved.⁠29⁠99⁠174

Two women, Moroccan and Algerian residents, were killed at Abha International Airport. A Sudanese man died at Riyadh’s King Khalid International Airport. Saudi Arabia’s civil-aviation authority says attacks on the two airports on October 6–7 killed three civilians and injured 36.⁠168

The Saudi-led coalition says it destroyed 82 Houthi military targets in retaliation. But October 8 brought further blasts, reported interceptions and extensive flight disruption in Riyadh. Retaliation has not ended the exchange, and no established new casualty total from Thursday replaces the October 6–7 accounting.⁠142⁠99⁠118

3Civilians killed in October 6–7 airport attacks 168
36People injured in those attacks 168
44.7%Riyadh departures affected in Thursday’s snapshot 118

On October 5, we reported the opening of the Saudi-backed Yemeni government’s offensive, disputed gains around Bab al-Mandab and unresolved Houthi claims of attacks on Aramco facilities. What has changed is the documented civilian airport toll, a specified retaliatory campaign and fresh disruption—not independent confirmation of every military claim.

We also reported 73 wounded in earlier attacks on September 9, and air alerts, a fuel-depot fire near Riyadh airport and flight disruption on September 19. Those were separate incidents; neither their casualties nor their images establish October’s damage.

What the airport accounting establishes

Abha’s 28 injured included Saudi citizens, a Bangladeshi resident and a Filipino resident. Riyadh’s eight injured were five Saudi citizens, two Egyptian residents and one Pakistani resident. Injuries ranged from minor to severe, and all injured people were taken to hospital. These are official figures, not an independently audited final count.⁠168

The original General Authority of Civil Aviation statement identifies Abha’s dead as Moroccan and Algerian women. Earlier reporting attributed to AFP described one as Egyptian; Arab News carried the Moroccan identification. The official accounting places two Egyptians among Riyadh’s injured, not Abha’s dead. The precise origin of the conflicting nationality report remains unestablished.⁠15⁠16⁠168

Both airports sustained material damage, but the damaged facilities and repair requirements remain unspecified. GACA dates the attacks collectively to October 6 and 7 without assigning each airport a day. Its statement neither names an attacker nor establishes an operational closure. Houthi spokesman Yahya Saree claimed missile and drone attacks.⁠15⁠168

Saree also named King Khalid Air Base in Khamis Mushait—a different facility from Riyadh’s international airport. The coalition’s earlier report of an interception north of Riyadh does not prove that no airport damage occurred. An interception and damage can coexist; the available evidence does not establish that they involved the same missile. Nor does documented damage verify Saree’s precise direct-hit claim.⁠23

A separate earlier account concerned attacks on Jazan’s King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Airport and Najran airport, with three minor injuries. The Telegraph’s October 6 description named three airports rather than two; that difference remains unreconciled. The later 36 injuries are not simply a demonstrated revision of those earlier three.⁠127⁠30

Thursday’s disruption is measurable

AFP heard repeated blasts across Riyadh on October 8. Diplomats described instructions to shelter inside embassies; at least one international school moved children into a basement, and some businesses in the King Abdullah Financial District evacuated staff. Saudi authorities had not explained the blasts in that initial account.⁠3

Later, the coalition said it intercepted three Houthi ballistic missiles, two headed toward Riyadh and one toward Khamis Mushait. Saudi Civil Defense reported intercepted-missile debris damaging a kindergarten and medical-clinic complex in Riyadh. No new casualties were confirmed in those accounts.⁠99⁠172

Reuters separately reported witnesses seeing smoke from a stationary aircraft at Riyadh airport. It was believed empty, and people briefed on the incident said the fire was extinguished. Saudi authorities had not confirmed its cause. Aircraft smoke is not independent proof of a missile hit; the absence of a confirmed new casualty report is not proof that every Thursday incident caused no injuries.⁠114

Saree threatened international airlines continuing to use Saudi airspace, excluding the airspace of the holy sites in Mecca and Medina. That is an armed group’s threat, not a formal airspace closure. The US Mission also warned citizens of potential further drone and missile attacks and escalation.⁠117⁠11

At 16:25 Saudi local time on October 8, Cirium figures reported by Gulf News showed 169 of 378 scheduled Riyadh departures cancelled or not operating—44.7 percent—and 124 of 369 arrivals affected. Departures included 97 of 140 for Saudia, 30 of 91 for flynas and 20 of 54 for flyadeal. This was a snapshot, not an all-day final tally or solely a formal cancellation count.⁠118

Philippine Airlines suspended Riyadh services through at least October 11; Air India Express and other carriers had cancellations through October 10. Other Gulf carriers continued using Saudi airspace, and Riyadh Air said its flights were operating as scheduled. Travellers were advised to check with their airlines: substantial disruption, not a blanket aviation halt.⁠118⁠115

Retaliation leaves the larger questions open

Coalition spokesman Major General Turki al-Maliki said the 82 targets destroyed lay in Saada, Hodeidah, Al-Jawf and Marib, including 11 mountain ballistic-missile stores in Saada. He warned attacks on civilians “will not go unpunished.” Independent verification of destruction, surrounding damage and civilian casualties is missing. Saree alleged civilian sites were hit in a broader bombardment, without providing a casualty total.⁠142⁠141

The offensive preceded the deadly airport attacks. Presidential Leadership Council chairman Rashad al-Alimi announced it on October 4; major operations followed October 5. Its stated objective was to retake all Houthi-held territory. Government-aligned forces claimed coastal gains, including around Dhubab and Mocha; the Houthis denied advances. Current control, particularly of the strait’s islands, remains uncertain.⁠40⁠33⁠31⁠32

The civilian displacement account is clearer than the battlefield map. IOM’s October 7 release recorded 201,217 people displaced across Yemen since fighting started and warned of rising needs and dwindling funding. This is not a count of people trapped inside Taiz city.⁠154

Channel 4 News reported 184,000 displaced on October 5 without a specified reporting period; France 24 English reported almost 100,000 “this month” that day. Associated Press via The Hill reported more than 200,000 by October 7. The newer nationwide account supersedes those older broad descriptions, but their differing scopes do not make them one reconciled series. They must not be added together.⁠39⁠34⁠23

Around Taiz, residents described cut roads, fuel shortages and rising food prices. The earlier one-day toll of more than 70 came from combatant-linked accounts: 34 government troops and 39 Houthi fighters. Independent confirmation remains lacking. A BBC correspondent’s estimate of four million trapped is not a verified city siege count; the extent of confinement and road access remains unsettled.⁠39⁠33⁠29⁠143

The October 5 Saudi-Pakistani-Turkish meeting produced pledged military support rather than demonstrated de-escalation. Troop numbers and deployment timing were undisclosed. On October 8, Hakan Fidan said Turkey’s agreement text was largely complete but parliamentary ratification remained pending; he described defensive assistance and ruled out troops for offensive operations. Preparation is not proof of deployment.⁠29⁠174

Mfuatano wa matukio

Siku ya 5 · 4 ripoti

Mfuatano wa matukio ya habari

  1. Wa kwanza kuripoti

  2. Three people were reported killed. A parked Saudia aircraft was damaged; descriptions of destruction remain unsupported by a recovered technical assessment.

  3. Tulichorusha · Sasisho 1Uko hapa

    Three Killed at Saudi Airports as Fresh Attacks Disrupt Riyadh Flights

  4. An attack hit the domestic-terminal complex serving Terminals 3 and 4. Accounts give 12 or 13 deaths and more than 300 injuries.

  5. An unidentified projectile struck Terminal 4, causing a fire. Saudi-authority accounts report one Pakistani resident or national killed and 11 people injured.

  6. Tulichorusha · Sasisho 2Mpya zaidi

    Riyadh Airport Was Closed for Safety Checks. Then It Was Hit Again.

  7. Tulichorusha · Sasisho 3Mpya zaidi

    Riyadh’s Airport Remains Suspended as Saudi Arabia Investigates Deadly Defense Breaches

  8. siku 11 baadaye

  9. Tulichorusha · Sasisho 4Mpya zaidi

    Two Riyadh airport terminals reportedly reopen. Flights are another question.
Kama ilivyorushwa
  1. On October 5 we reported disputed coastal gains. Now airport attacks have killed three civilians. Thirty-six people were injured, and further attacks and flight disruption extend the danger beyond Yemen. What is established about the civilian damage, and what remains unverified in the widening military exchange?
  2. Both civilian airports sustained material damage. The deaths and 36 injuries belong to attacks on October 6 and 7, not an established new toll from October 8. Emergency and security personnel responded at both airports.
  3. At Abha, two women, Moroccan and Algerian residents, were killed and 28 people were injured. At Riyadh's King Khalid International Airport, a Sudanese man was killed and eight people were injured. These are official civilian casualty figures, not an independently audited final count.
  4. The injured at Abha included Saudi citizens, one Bangladeshi resident and one Filipino resident. Riyadh's injured were five Saudi citizens, two Egyptian residents and one Pakistani resident. Injuries ranged from minor to severe, and everyone in the injury accounting was taken to hospital.
  5. One woman killed at Abha was Moroccan, not Egyptian. Earlier descriptions conflicted on that nationality. The original accounting places two Egyptian residents among Riyadh's injured, not Abha's dead. The precise origin of the conflicting account is not established.
  6. The casualty statement dates the attacks collectively to October 6 and 7 without assigning a day to each airport. It does not identify an attacker, establish an operational closure, or specify the damaged facilities and repair requirements.
  7. The Riyadh international airport and King Khalid Air Base in Khamis Mushait are separate facilities. Houthi claims named both, along with Abha airport and bases in Najran and Asir. Those claims do not independently establish the weapons or impacts at each location.
  8. The Houthis claimed missile and drone attacks on the airports. A precise, direct ballistic-missile hit on Riyadh airport remains unverified. Documented airport damage establishes consequences, but not every detail of the armed group's account.
  9. One intercepted missile does not prove that no airport damage occurred. The coalition released interception footage and later claimed it destroyed a launcher in Sanaa. The available information does not establish that the interception and airport damage involved exactly the same missile.
  10. A separate earlier airport incident left three people with minor injuries and caused material damage at Jazan's King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Airport and Najran airport. An October 6 description named three airports rather than two. That difference is not fully reconciled, and the later 36 injuries are not simply a demonstrated revision of those earlier three.
  11. Repeated blasts brought new protective measures across Riyadh on October 8. Diplomats received instructions to shelter inside embassies. At least one international school moved children into a basement, and some businesses in the King Abdullah Financial District evacuated staff.
  12. Saudi authorities had not explained those blasts in the first account. Later, the coalition claimed it intercepted and destroyed three Houthi ballistic missiles: two headed toward Riyadh and one toward Khamis Mushait.
  13. Missile debris damaged a kindergarten and a medical-clinic complex in Riyadh. Separately, witnesses saw smoke from a stationary aircraft at the airport. The aircraft was believed empty, and the fire was reported extinguished, but its cause remains unconfirmed.
  14. No new casualties were confirmed in those accounts. That is not proof that every October 8 incident caused no injuries. Nor is aircraft smoke independent proof of the direct missile hit claimed by the Houthis.
  15. The Houthis threatened international airlines continuing to use Saudi airspace, describing it as a theater of military operations. Their warning excluded the airspace of the holy sites in Mecca and Medina. It is an armed group's threat, not a formal airspace closure.
  16. The first October 8 statement, at 02:51 UTC, claimed an accurate missile hit on King Khalid airport and disrupted operations. Statements at 12:33 and 15:45 UTC claimed further attacks on King Khalid, Najran and the Khamis Mushait air base. Their claimed impacts remain unverified. A United States security alert also warned citizens of potential further drone and missile attacks and possible escalation.
  17. Flight disruption is measurable. At 16:25 Saudi local time on October 8, 169 of 378 scheduled Riyadh departures, 44.7 percent, were cancelled or not operating. The same snapshot showed 124 of 369 arrivals affected. This is not a final all-day tally.
  18. These figures include flights cancelled or not operating; they are not solely a count of formal cancellations. Brief disruption had appeared in flight tracking before this later operational snapshot.
  19. Saudia had 97 of 140 scheduled departures cancelled or not operating. The comparable counts were 30 of 91 for flynas and 20 of 54 for flyadeal. These carrier figures describe the same time-specific snapshot, not separate additional disruption totals.
  20. Some flights continued while other services were suspended. Other Gulf carriers were still using Saudi airspace, and Riyadh Air said its flights were operating as scheduled. The evidence does not establish that all Saudi aviation stopped.
  21. Philippine Airlines suspended Riyadh flights through at least October 11. Air India Express and other carriers had cancellations through October 10. The airport advised travellers to check with their airlines. The complete timing of service restoration remains unresolved.
  22. A missile near Aden's runway also disrupted an inbound flight. The official account describes Yemenia Flight 603 arriving from Cairo and diverting to Jeddah, not a Cairo-bound flight landing safely at Aden. No airport-incident casualties were reported, and flights later resumed.
  23. An earlier description gave an Aden landing around 03:30. That landing claim is not supported by the ministry's diversion account; raw flight-tracking evidence has not independently settled the discrepancy. A separate Houthi claim of Saudi officers killed or wounded at nearby Badr camp remains unverified.
  24. The coalition claimed it destroyed 82 Houthi military targets in retaliation and warned that attacks on civilians would not go unpunished. The destruction claim has not been independently assessed, and no verified civilian casualty total exists for that wave.
  25. The claimed targets lay in Saada, Hodeidah, Al-Jawf and Marib. They included 11 mountain ballistic-missile stores in Saada, command-and-control and communications facilities, depots and assembly areas. The coalition separately described destroying a launch platform in Sanaa preparing another attack.
  26. Earlier wording of more than 80 targets is compatible with 82, not a competing verified total. The Houthis claimed 156 Saudi air and missile strikes on Sanaa and five provinces, alleging civilian sites were hit without giving a casualty total. Strikes and targets are different measures; subtracting one count from the other would not establish a discrepancy.
  27. Neither side's description establishes the full civilian impact in Yemen. Saudi airport victims do not prove every retaliatory target was military. A Houthi allegation of civilian damage does not establish that allegation. Surrounding damage and civilian harm remain independently unmeasured.
  28. The government campaign preceded the deadly airport attacks. Its objective was to retake all Houthi-held territory and restore state institutions. The October 4 announcement was followed by major ground and air operations on October 5, with Saudi Arabia pledging full operational support.
  29. The campaign is called Operation Dawn of Yemen, also rendered Operation Yemen Dawn. The coalition described 100 fighter jets and more than 300 targets struck; a government spokesperson described more than 100 jets. These remain campaign claims, not independently verified aircraft or target ledgers.
  30. The earlier account of more than 1,000 strikes did not establish precisely who carried them out. It cannot be corrected simply by substituting a newer target count. Aircraft, strikes and targets measure different things across different reporting periods.
  31. Government-aligned forces claimed gains at Dhubab, Bab and Hadeid near Bab al-Mandab, including Dhubab's airstrip and key roads. The Giants Brigades claimed they cut the Mocha–Dhubab road. The Houthis denied government advances and retreat.
  32. Witness accounts described tanks entering towns. Later government statements claimed Mocha's recapture and effective control of the strait or an adjacent oil route. Other accounts described forces approaching Mocha or holding key infrastructure rather than the whole city. Mocha, Mokha and Moca are different spellings of this same port.
  33. The coastal-gains question remains open. Reported Houthi gains in September have been followed by government counteroffensive claims, not an independently established map of current control. The strait's islands remain particularly unclear, as does whether claimed advances will hold.
  34. The campaign's death toll is unresolved too. Government spokespeople claimed 1,747, then 1,860 Houthi personnel neutralised, with the latter figure appearing on October 8. Neutralised is not defined clearly enough to mean killed. A Houthi claim of two killed and seven injured in October 5 attacks is also unverified and not an established total for the offensive.
  35. Coastal positions can support attacks on shipping and constrain supply routes. Mocha lies approximately 75 kilometres north of the strait. A contextual estimate puts about 12 percent of global trade through the area, but that share has not been independently remeasured here.
  36. Even real Houthi territorial losses could reduce, rather than eliminate, the threat to Red Sea shipping. Houthi-held areas were estimated to contain about 70 percent of Yemen's population and one-third of its territory. Those estimates are not current audited boundaries.
  37. An imminent government advance into the northwestern highlands or Sanaa was assessed as unlikely. That forecast does not establish what will happen, and claimed coastal success does not establish that commercial passage has become safe.
  38. The civilian displacement count is clearer than the battlefield map. By October 7, 201,217 people, representing 33,776 households, had been forced from their homes across Yemen. Within that accounting, 197,755 had fled since September 1. Taiz governorate accounted for 114,708, about 57 percent.
  39. Displacement in Taiz governorate was concentrated in Al Ma'afer, Jabal Habashi and Ash Shamayatayn. More than 3,700 people had fled by sea to Djibouti. These are displacement counts, not a count of people trapped inside Taiz city.
  40. The dated mid-September estimate was approximately 76,000. A September 28 accounting recorded 145,308 people in 24,218 households across eight governorates since the West Coast escalation in June. That was an increase of 15,870 people, more than 12 percent, since September 21.
  41. Earlier descriptions of almost 100,000, more than 100,000 or 184,000 displaced used differing or unspecified periods. The latest nationwide total supersedes those broad descriptions for the current account. It does not prove that every earlier estimate counted the same places and dates.
  42. Those estimates must not be added together or treated as one reconciled statistical series. Humanitarian needs are rising while funding is alarmingly short.
  43. Cut roads, fuel shortages and rising food prices are compounding the danger around Taiz. Accounts describe Houthi advances toward the city, Turbah's seizure and the cutting of the Taiz–Aden route at al-Safiya. The precise extent of confinement remains unsettled.
  44. Government-aligned Homeland Shield forces also claimed gains and a drone strike on the Al Wazir front. Some accounts described Taiz as surrounded with its remaining road blocked; others described an attempt to encircle it. Neither wording establishes a verified current account of every road's accessibility.
  45. An estimate of about four million people trapped must not become a verified count inside Taiz city. The wider governorate has been described as having nearly 4.5 million residents. A population estimate does not establish how many people are physically confined.
  46. An earlier one-day fighting toll of more than 70 included 34 government troops and 39 Houthi fighters in accounts linked to opposing sides. It is not an independently confirmed current cumulative toll. Another Houthi account of losses does not resolve that uncertainty.
  47. A hospital received 24 casualties in 24 hours, including a 12-year-old girl hit by shrapnel; that does not mean 24 deaths. A later account described four people shot by snipers, without establishing all died. About 200 families reached El Muni camp in ten days.
  48. El Muni camp was described as roughly 20 kilometres from the front. An October 3 humanitarian assessment found three in four families in parts of Yemen going hungry. That finding does not establish the same rate everywhere in the country today.
  49. The Aramco fire's cause remains unresolved. Flames, smoke and firefighters were observed south of Riyadh on October 3. Houthi claims of attacks around Riyadh and Khurais did not establish responsibility, and the coalition called the Riyadh claims misleading.
  50. No Saudi or Aramco confirmation of Khurais damage has been established, and an asserted East–West pipeline halt remains uncorroborated. Reported cage-like protective fencing around equipment near Riyadh airport shows a protective measure, not evidence that the equipment was hit. New airport casualty documentation does not answer those oil-facility questions.
  51. On September 9, we reported 73 wounded in the previous day's attacks. On September 19, we reported air alerts, a fuel-depot fire near the main airport and disrupted flights. Those were earlier incidents; their injuries and fire cannot establish October's casualties or damage.
  52. The current accounting documents three civilian airport deaths and 36 injuries. It does not retroactively verify the causes of earlier fires or settle disputed coastal control.
  53. The Riyadh meeting produced movement toward military support, not an end to the attacks. Saudi, Pakistani and Turkish officials and commanders met on October 5 under the Mecca defence framework. Their agreement would facilitate rapid deployment of forces and capabilities supporting Saudi Arabia.
  54. No troop numbers or deployment timetable were disclosed. A political commitment and secretariat were reported, but no public authorisation for Pakistani or Turkish combat inside Yemen has been established. Continued strikes show the meeting did not produce a visible end to the exchange.
  55. Turkey had not ratified the pact by October 8 at 15:54 UTC. The text was largely complete, had been presented to the president on Wednesday and was to go to parliament as soon as possible. Finalising the text is not ratifying it.
  56. Turkey described the pact as defensive, ruled out troops for offensive operations and said military delegations were assessing air-defence contributions. Possible assistance included equipment, intelligence, weapons systems, drones and logistics. These are possibilities and preparations, not a confirmed deployed Turkish combat force.
  57. Turkey's legal ground-troop deployment route under the agreement depended on ratification. Pakistan's longstanding defence ties could permit assistance sooner, but that is a capacity assessment, not a timetable. An official description of a presence in the theatre does not establish personnel locations, sizes or roles.
  58. That description said Pakistan and Turkey had a presence while only Saudi forces were in combat. It is not independent confirmation of either country's deployment particulars.
  59. American personnel numbers remain incompletely disclosed. September 10 accounts described more than 100 military advisers, with one estimate near 200. An October 5 secondary account claimed more than 200 analysts. Those dated estimates establish neither a current October headcount nor a demonstrated increase.
  60. A September 11 account described Mohammed bin Salman seeking American military help and Donald Trump declining US strikes on the Houthis, while Washington offered intelligence sharing and targeting assistance. The earlier adviser accounts described intelligence and targeting work under tight limits.
  61. The United States backed Saudi Arabia's right to defend itself without disclosing detailed coordination. Assessments described battlefield intelligence, planning, precision-guided munitions and other CENTCOM support, but not all those operational details have been independently established.
  62. A suggestion of covert Israeli intelligence or targeting help remains speculation, not a substantiated Israeli role. An account of the UAE vice president and senior security officials visiting Saudi Arabia before the offensive does not establish a new operational commitment.
  63. The answer is that civilian airport damage and casualties are documented, and aviation disruption is extensive. Precise direct-hit claims, the full civilian impact of retaliation, durable coastal gains and actual outside-force commitments remain unresolved. No established new October 8 casualty total replaces the October 6–7 accounting.
  64. Further airport casualties, the causes of October 8 impacts and the resumption of suspended services still need to be established. In Yemen, 201,217 people were in the latest nationwide displacement accounting while humanitarian needs rose and funding remained alarmingly short.

Vyanzo110

Kati ya vyanzo vilivyonukuliwa hapa, AFP.com ndicho kilichochapisha kwanza, siku 5 kabla ya ripoti hii kupeperushwa. Vyombo 76 zaidi vya habari vilifuata.
  1. AFP.com
  2. Hindustan Times
  3. Al Jazeera
  4. Daily Pakistan English News
  5. The National
  6. Israel.com
  7. L'Orient Today
  8. Türkiye Today
  9. +vyombo 69 zaidi vya habari
  10. HeyDay News

Makala 4 za awali zilisomwa kupata usuli.Vyombo 30 vya habari visivyo na tarehe:alarabiya.netAnadoluAlmajallaANI Newsapnews.comarabnn.news

Habari inayoendelea · ripoti 1 kati ya 4

Vyanzo vyote, kwa chombo cha habari

vyanzo 178 kutoka vyombo 110 vya habari· Vilivyotajwa zaidi kwanza

Zilizorushwa hivi karibuni