ビジネス · 銀行のコンプライアンスバンク・オブ・アメリカは収益を優先、制裁金は今や12億1000万ドル超執筆 2026年10月14日 11:33 UTC視聴文字起こし0:07Bank of America failed to report more than $5 billion in suspicious transactions on0:12time.0:12America's second-largest bank has admitted willful violations of federal anti-money0:16laundering law.0:17Its civil penalties and sanctions settlement total more than $1.21 billion.0:22Can the bank now catch the activity its own controls let through?0:25The bank admitted failures in its anti-money laundering program, checks on foreign0:29financial institutions, and suspicious activity reporting.0:33The violations covered at least January 1st, 2018, through July 1st, 2025, with0:39some findings covering more specific periods.0:41Those foreign institutions used correspondent accounts, which let one financial0:45institution provide banking services to another.0:47The bank had to check the risks those relationships carried.0:49Suspicious activity reports alert investigators to possible wrongdoing.0:53A suspicious transaction can warrant a report before anyone proves a crime.0:57More than $5 billion in activity went without timely detection and reporting.1:01Within that total, more than $1 billion involved national security or other priority1:05risks.1:06Investigators lost the chance to receive those warnings promptly.1:09Treasury announced the coordinated enforcement actions on October 13, 2026.1:14FinCEN, its financial crime watchdog, assessed a $1.2 billion civil penalty.1:20The bank regulator, known as the OCC, assessed $750 million.1:25The OCC's $750 million counts toward FinCEN's assessment, leaving $450 million1:31payable to FinCEN.1:32Treasury's sanctions office, OFAC, separately settled for1:35$11,662,930.1:38Treasury called the combined action its third largest penalty.1:42The OCC assessment is the largest in that agency's history.1:46The penalties have been assessed and the sanctions settlement has been agreed.1:49FinCEN found that Bank of America put revenue first while limiting the burden on its1:54compliance resources.1:55Managers left weaknesses in place despite internal testing and warnings.1:59Outside concerns also failed to produce adequate repairs.2:03The bank's own tests repeatedly found activity that warranted reporting.2:07but fell below its investigation threshold.2:09In several periods, groups just below the cutoff produced a higher share of2:13suspicious activity reports than groups that cleared it.2:16The bank's event processor monitoring system grouped alerts and generally required2:2020 risk points before an investigation.2:22Automatic promotion could bypass that cutoff.2:25The bank lowered the threshold to 10 or 12 points in December 2023, depending on the2:30group's characteristics.2:31The original cutoff rested on stakeholder judgment without enough testing to support2:35it.2:35The system initially counted alerts within a 13-month window, later shortened and2:39dropped older alerts from scoring.2:41Risk factors carried inadequate weights.2:43Risk scoring and suppression rules could wipe out factors without sufficient2:47controls.2:47The system had limited coverage of check-like instruments, credit card activity, and2:51possible laundering through trade.2:53Law enforcement or another bank often raised concerns before activity reached2:57investigation.2:58External or manual alerts frequently supplied the 20 points needed to trigger3:02action.3:02Activity could sit uninvestigated for long periods, and some eventual reports gave3:07investigators little useful information.3:09The bank also failed to respond adequately when staff escalated warning signs3:13involving high-risk customers.3:15A limited review in 2024 uncovered nearly 8,900 missed suspicious activity reports,3:21covering nearly $4 billion in transactions.3:24The bank conducted that look back after changing the monitoring thresholds in3:28December 2023.3:30The same review led to more than 8,000 filings covering about $3.96 billion.3:35Those figures describe one review.3:37The later filings show that previously missed activity eventually reached3:41investigators, but they couldn't restore the time lost.3:44Potential laundering through trade had a substantial southwest border connection,3:48including activity involving salvaged vehicles.3:50FinCEN also identified risks involving Chinese money laundering networks and fraud.3:55These findings concerned suspicious financial activity that the bank's controls3:58failed to handle adequately.4:00High-risk international wires included activity involving Georgia and Belarus.4:04Online auto-auction customers made third-party payments or used financial4:08instruments potentially connected to narcotics proceeds.4:10The bank's checks on those customers failed to respond adequately to red flags even4:14after concerns were escalated.4:15Trade-based money laundering uses commercial transactions to move or disguise money.4:20Here, regulators identified potential laundering involving vehicle-related trade.4:24Suspicious patterns required investigation and reporting without treating every4:28vehicle buyer or cross-border transaction as criminal.4:31The OCC found weaknesses across a much larger transaction universe.4:35Deficient monitoring covered trillions of dollars in transactions, and potentially4:40suspicious activity sometimes went without escalation for years.4:43The OCC found late reports involving billions of dollars, many showing money4:48laundering indicators, compliance officers and staff lacked sufficient expertise and4:52training, and the audit function failed.4:54Management minimized deficiencies and left significant corrective work unfinished4:58after a December 2024 order.5:00The bank remains subject to that earlier cease-and-desist order.5:03The trillions described transactions exposed to deficient monitoring.5:06Regulators' findings about possible laundering concerns, suspicious activity within5:10that much larger universe.5:12OFAC's separate settlement covers 475 apparent sanctions violations between5:16September 2021 and April 2025.5:19The underlying transactions were worth about $14.8 million.5:23The settlement resolves potential civil liability for those apparent violations.5:27The affected sanctions programs targeted Russia, Belarus, Iran, Burma, and Somalia,5:32as well as narcotics and global terrorism.5:34Payments involving blocked banks slipped through because of technical and human5:38errors, delayed updates, and suppressed alerts.5:40413 apparent violations weren't voluntarily disclosed, while 62 were OFAC classified5:46the conduct as non-egregious.5:48Its formal severity category, the settlement, received no reduction from the base5:52penalty for remediation or cooperation.5:54The bank failed to prioritize exact name and birth date matches to blocked people.5:59Vendor and system problems delayed watch list updates.6:02Human errors also affected two business accounts linked to blocked people.6:05OFAC cited recklessness, prior cautionary letters and harm to sanctions objectives.6:10Particularly after Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Bank of America says financial6:13crime compliance is serious, and it's responsible for getting it right.6:17It says it has invested billions in technology and dedicated thousands of employees6:22to fighting financial crime.6:23It says its team is far along with the required repairs.6:26The bank also points to its support for law enforcement and high volumes of6:30suspicious activity reports.6:32The enforcement findings focus on whether necessary reports arrive promptly and6:36contain information investigators can use.6:38The bank says it will record a $1.2 billion non-tax deductible charge in third6:43quarter results.6:44That would reduce net income by about 17 cents per share.6:47Its 2025 net income was $30.509 billion.6:51Second quarter 2026 net income was $9.074 billion.6:56First half net income, including that quarter, was $17.658 billion.7:01The announced charge equals about 3.9% of last year's earnings.7:05Repair costs are already included in the bank's expenses.7:08FinCEN now requires independent consultants to search for missed activity and test7:12monitoring, customer checks, and foreign correspondent checks.7:15They must also review how the bank manages its anti-money laundering data.7:18Existing OCC consultants or lookbacks can serve certain purposes only with FinCEN's7:23approval.7:23The reviews target priority risks, including southwest border activity, cartels, and7:28narcotics, Iran, and Russia.7:30OFAC's commitments also require training, testing, and audit, along with continuing7:34communication and cooperation.7:35The bank must propose a qualified lookback consultant within 60 days of execution,7:40with an intended hire within 30 days.7:43FinCEN can veto the choice.7:44A report defining the review's scope is due within 150 days of engagement.7:49The detailed lookback report is due within 18 months of that scope report.7:53Further required suspicious activity reports must be filed within 90 days after the7:57lookback report.7:58The monitoring effectiveness report is due within 45 days after that review8:02finishes, and no later than July 2028.8:05The lookback report must arrive no later than December 2028.8:09The order specifies those months without naming particular days.8:12Other final reports on customer checks and data governance generally have deadlines8:16within a year of consultant engagement, subject to the required approvals.8:20The remaining $450 million is due within 10 calendar days after FinCEN signs,8:26excluding the signing day.8:27The signature dates are blank, so the calendar deadline is unclear.8:30We don't know whether the bank has paid or engaged the consultants.8:33Independent reviews still have to show whether the repaired controls catch8:37suspicious activity promptly and produce useful reports.8:41The bank must search for activity missed before, file the required reports, and8:45demonstrate that its controls work, under continuing oversight extending into 2028.記事を読むストーリーの時系列HeyDexショート動画 ↗誰が何を報じたか複数のメディアが報じた論点✓Total Bank of America enforcement penalty独立して確認 · 5媒体FinCEN assessment and national security risks3媒体Suspicious transactions and reporting failures3媒体OFAC sanctions violations and settlement2媒体Bank statement on financial-crime compliance2媒体1社だけが報じた論点19U.S. Treasuryのみが報道Bank admission of willful violations10月13日 14:26 UTCOCC assessment and its relationship to FinCEN penalty10月13日 14:26 UTCOCC monitoring of transactions10月13日 14:26 UTCCompliance with the 2024 cease-and-desist order10月13日 14:26 UTCHistorical ranking of the penalty10月13日 14:26 UTCOFAC credit for cooperation or remediation10月13日 14:26 UTCBloomberg Televisionのみが報道Money-laundering and sanctions violations10月14日 16:02 UTCTiming and accounting of remediation costs10月14日 18:45 UTCThird-quarter equities trading revenue10月14日 16:02 UTCEarnings impact of the regulatory charge10月14日 16:02 UTCRevenue prioritized over compliance10月14日 6:44 UTCThird-quarter fixed-income trading revenue10月14日 16:02 UTCCease-and-desist order after examination10月14日 18:45 UTCResolution of dispute over required actions10月14日 18:45 UTCMorgan Stanley wealth-management inflows10月15日 5:19 UTCRisks linked to Chinese networks and border finance10月13日 20:25 UTCRemediation tasks completed10月14日 18:45 UTCMoynihan's account of resolution and remediation spending10月15日 5:19 UTCAnalyst view of management's response10月14日 11:26 UTC各行は、そのメディアの報道から私たちが記録した主張です。2026年10月15日 12:05 UTC時点で比較。
