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科技 · 虚假紧急警报

乌克兰核警报虚假事件暴露警报系统的信任危机

核威胁和化学威胁虚假警报扰乱了战时民用生命线。警报推送已恢复，但入侵的波及范围、入口和实施者仍未查明。

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译自英文原文。

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  1. 第 1 次更新乌克兰核警报虚假事件暴露警报系统的信任危机当前位置

当一款提醒人们寻求避难的应用开始捏造紧急情况时，人们该怎么办？对于2026年11月1日晚收到核威胁、化学威胁和街头交火虚假警报的乌克兰人来说，这并非抽象的网络安全问题。一条熟悉的民用生命线发出了他们无法信任的指示。乌克兰空军表示没有辐射威胁，并称这很可能是对Air Alert应用的恶意干扰。1

眼下的应对办法是拒绝已确认的虚假消息，而不是放弃真正的空袭警报。官员指引居民关注空军通报、地方当局和其他经核实的警报渠道，同时提醒他们不要点击可疑链接。随后，通知推送恢复。尚未解决的问题包括入侵的全部波及范围、技术入口、实施者身份，以及应用的各项功能何时全部恢复。1 18 79

区分两件事——不相信遭到篡改的消息，与完全不理会警报系统——正是公共安全问题的核心。通过技术工作可以恢复服务。要重建信心，则需要让人们知道哪些指示是真实的。

一连串凭空捏造的紧急情况

首批虚假通知于周日晚上基辅时间约10:45–10:47出现。CBC记者安娜·坎宁安（Anna Cunningham）描述了三分钟内收到的四条消息：辐射危险、全国核警报、化学威胁，以及基辅街头发生交火。部分消息告诫人们不要外出。这是报道所述的一种情况，并非对每位用户所收到内容的全面审计。19 10

部分消息以俄语显示。一条消息谎称一枚榛树（Oreshnik）导弹正在袭来；其他报道提到虚假的弹道导弹和炮击警报。这些都是欺骗性通知，并非核打击、化学袭击或街头交战的证据。1 3

警报、辟谣与恢复

  1. 11月1日，基辅时间晚上10:47

    CBS将Air Alert虚假通知的开始时间定在此时；NBC报道称大约从晚上10:45开始。

    8
  2. 11月1日，基辅时间晚上11:02

    空军称这些通知是假的，并否认存在辐射威胁。

    8
  3. 截至11月2日午夜，基辅时间

    国家紧急情况服务部门称，全国警报系统运行正常，并指引居民关注地方当局和扬声器信号。

    1
  4. 11月2日凌晨约2点

    应用宣布逐步恢复服务，但空中目标显示功能仍暂停。

    1

时间间隔很重要。空军在最初约15分钟内作出辟谣。告知用户无视虚假警报的后续通知，则在这些警报开始约一小时后，或一个多小时后才发出。《基辅独立报》称约一小时，英国广播公司则称一个多小时。两种说法都不意味着居民在整段时间里一直等不到官方否认。8 1 16

此次中断的影响还超出了手机屏幕。包括乌克兰西部外喀尔巴阡州在内的多个地区响起警报器。NBC援引乌克兰媒体报道称，利沃夫州的一些公共警报器和扩音器播放了辐射危险信号。这些报道并未证实每次警报器响起的原因，也没有说明每条虚假通知出现时是否同时存在真实的空袭威胁。1 19

地方官员试图将令人恐慌的消息与当地实际情况区分开来。伊万诺-弗兰科夫斯克州州长斯维特拉娜·奥尼什丘克（Svitlana Onyshchuk）报告称，该地区局势平静。文尼察州州长娜塔莉娅·扎博洛特娜（Natalia Zabolotna）直接给出一项预防建议：“不要点击消息中的链接。”这些是当时的地方安抚和指示，并非持续有效的全国性解除警报通告。1

现有报道没有公布经过核实的接收人数总数。路透社称，基辅有数百万部手机收到了这些警报。大西洋理事会网络政策专家泰森·巴克（Tyson Barker）告诉德国之声，该应用每天有400万名用户，累计下载量超过4700万次。这些用户规模数据未经独立审计，而且这些数字都无法证明有多少人收到了虚假消息。下载量不等于当前的独立用户数；也不能默认整款应用的所有用户都受到了影响。9 13

哪些内容遭到破坏，哪些没有

Air Alert是一款官方支持的民用警报应用，由Ajax Systems和Stfalcon开发，并得到数字转型部支持。它不是军事防空系统。乌克兰当局称该系统未遭破坏，空军发言人尤里·伊格纳特（Yurii Ihnat）表示，安全行动未受影响。因此，公众收到虚假通知，并不表明军事指挥、雷达或拦截系统遭到接管。64 16 8

但军事系统完好，并不意味着民用渠道遭到篡改就无害。人们会依据这些面向公众的信息，决定何时中断日常生活、前往避难。此次入侵干扰了相关建议的传递，即使军事行动仍在继续。

开发者承认发生了未经授权的干扰，关闭了推送通知，并暂时停用了应用。后续说明称，受到干扰的是运营商界面——也就是用于运行服务的控制界面——而非每位用户手机上安装的应用遭到破坏。这一说法并未说明入侵者最初是如何取得访问权限的。1 58

巴克早些时候提出推送警报供应商可能遭到破坏的说法仍属初步判断，技术取证工作还在进行。同样，官员提醒人们谨防网络钓鱼，是针对可疑链接的预防措施，并不能证明此次入侵由网络钓鱼导致。不能把这两种说法中的任何一种当作已证实的解释。13 1

服务恢复分阶段进行。推送通知恢复了，但11月2日上午的报道仍称，空中目标地图显示功能处于停用状态。当晚，美联社报道称，乌克兰警报服务已恢复运行。这些说法可以同时成立：警报恢复推送，并不能证明地图的所有功能也已恢复。现有记录无法确定所有功能完全恢复的最终时间。79 81 6

开发者表示，他们正在增添安全措施，并称应用不存储或使用个人数据。这是运营方的保证，并非对所有关联系统进行的独立审计。报道没有证实用户数据遭到窃取。1

责任归属仍是另一个问题

乌克兰战略传播中心SPRAVDI将责任归咎于俄罗斯。此后，总统沃洛迪米尔·泽连斯基（Volodymyr Zelenskyy）在接受PBS NewsHour采访时称，俄罗斯袭击了乌克兰的警报系统，乌克兰则通过黑客攻击俄罗斯作出回应。他的说法影响重大，但并非独立的技术归因；这次采访也没有证实其所称回应的确切范围。25 5 7

俄罗斯紧急情况部另行报告称，在乌克兰警报出现数小时后，该部也遭遇了入侵。该部称，攻击者利用其应用管理面板的漏洞发送虚假信息。报道提到，虚假信息包括核弹头袭击警报，以及囤积食物、躲进地下室的指示；该部后来表示，服务已恢复。这些细节涉及俄罗斯的应用，并不能解释乌克兰的服务是如何遭到入侵的。8 1 19

两起事件时间接近，并不能证明它们有关联。英国广播公司监测部门分析师维塔利·切夫琴科（Vitali Chevchenko）表示，他没有看到能够确定实施者身份或证明两者存在关联的可信证据。《卫报》还报道了一项未经证实的说法：一个名为Hitcore的团体声称对此负责。消息用语、关联频道和看似黑客团体的特征都只是线索，并非已证实的责任链条。16 17

路透社将眼前的人身影响描述为短暂恐慌，英国广播公司则称引发担忧但没有大范围恐慌；两种说法并不一定矛盾。路透社报道称没有明显的持久损害，但这并非全面的损害评估。网络安全专家马修·沃伦（Matthew Warren）警告称，篡改一个受信任的警报来源可能削弱人们对官方信息的信任。这种风险是合理的，但人们对真实警报的反应是否会长期改变，尚未得到衡量。9 3 20

对于基辅居民，数字转型部推荐使用Kyiv Digital作为另一个空袭警报信息来源。官员还指引人们关注空军通报、地方当局以及经当地核实的警报应用。他们的建议很明确：无视已确认的虚假通知，不要点击可疑链接或相信未经核实的消息，并继续遵循真实警报和当地避难指示。应用恢复，意味着一种沟通手段重新可用。人们是否会相信下一次真实警报，仍是更难回答的问题。1 18

播出原貌 20 行
  1. Ukraine's emergency app sent false nuclear warnings to people relying on it for protection.
  2. The Air Force said there was no radiation threat. But false messages and sounding sirens disrupted a civilian lifeline during war. How far did the intrusion reach, and could people still rely on genuine warnings?
  3. Four false messages arrived within three minutes in one sequence. The warnings described radiation danger, a nationwide nuclear alert, a chemical threat and fighting in Kyiv's streets. Some told people to stay indoors.
  4. The messages began late on November first, twenty twenty-six. Some appeared in Russian. One falsely claimed that an Oreshnik missile was on its way. Other notifications warned of ballistic missiles and artillery shelling. The Air Force described likely hostile interference with the Air Alert app.
  5. The Air Force rejected the warnings within about fifteen minutes and told people to stay calm. The false alerts were cleared about an hour or more after they began. People had an official rebuttal before that later clearance.
  6. The reassurance addressed the extreme dangers described in those messages. It didn't remove the need to follow genuine air-raid warnings. People still needed reliable information about when to seek shelter, even while one familiar channel was sending them false instructions.
  7. Sirens sounded as far west as Zakarpattia. Some sirens and loudspeakers in Lviv region reportedly broadcast a radiation-hazard signal. Kyiv appeared in the false chemical and street-fighting messages. Regional officials elsewhere also issued reassurances and safety advice.
  8. The disruption reached multiple regions, but nobody has published a verified total of recipients. Millions of phones in Kyiv reportedly received warnings. That estimate doesn't tell us how many people elsewhere were reached, or whether every user received the same sequence.
  9. Ivano-Frankivsk Governor Svitlana Onyshchuk said conditions in her region were calm. Vinnytsia Governor Natalia Zabolotna warned, “Do not click on the link in the message.” Those instructions addressed the suspicious notifications people were receiving.
  10. Air Alert was developed with Ajax Systems and Stfalcon, with support from the Digital Transformation Ministry. It's a civilian warning application. Ukrainian authorities said military air defence remained secure, and Air Force spokesperson Yurii Ihnat said security operations were unaffected.
  11. The developers disabled push notifications and temporarily suspended the app. They later described interference with the operator interface, the controls used to run the service. They also said they were adding security measures and that the app didn't store or use personal data.
  12. Officials warned that suspicious links could be part of a phishing operation, designed to deceive people into handing over information. They urged residents to avoid those links. The technical investigation hadn't settled how the intruder got in. An early suggestion involving a notification supplier remained preliminary.
  13. The State Emergency Service said nationwide warnings were operating normally by midnight. Around two in the morning, the app announced gradual restoration. Push alerts returned, while the aerial-target map remained disabled. By that evening, the service was operating again.
  14. Russia's Emergencies Ministry reported a separate intrusion hours after the Ukrainian warnings. It said attackers exploited a weakness in its app's administrative panel and sent false information. Russian users received bogus nuclear-warhead warnings and instructions to stock up on food and hide in basements. The ministry later said service was restored.
  15. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy blamed Russia for attacking Ukraine's warning system and said Ukraine responded by hacking Russia. Ukraine's Centre for Strategic Communications also blamed Russia. His account connected the incidents, but technical investigators hadn't publicly demonstrated that connection or identified the perpetrators.
  16. Zelenskyy didn't spell out the precise scope of Ukraine's response. A separate claim of responsibility involving a group called Hitcore also remained unconfirmed. Russian wording in a message, a linked channel and two disruptions close together couldn't settle who controlled either operation.
  17. Cyber policy expert Tyson Barker put the audience at four million daily users and more than forty-seven million downloads. Those figures weren't audited counts of affected people. Cybersecurity expert Matthew Warren warned that corrupted alerts could weaken trust in official information.
  18. The warnings caused concern and some momentary panic, without widespread panic being described. There were no immediate reports of lasting damage. But the longer-term concern is trust: people already living with frequent alerts could become less willing to act when a real warning arrives. That effect hasn't been measured.
  19. For Kyiv residents, the Digital Transformation Ministry recommended Kyiv Digital as another source of air-alert information. Officials also directed people to Air Force updates, local authorities and locally validated warning apps, while urging them to avoid spreading unverified messages.
  20. Notification delivery resumed, and authorities said military security operations continued throughout. The final return of every app feature hasn't been confirmed. Officials' safety advice was to disregard the identified fake messages, avoid suspicious links and continue following genuine warnings and local shelter instructions.

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