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冲突 · 也门攻势持续报道 · 第 7 篇，共 7 篇

也门战事致200,000人流离失所，机场遭袭

国际移民组织记录了更大范围局势升级期间的201,217名流离失所者。机场伤亡和客机据报改道的情况，比各方对沿海战果的相互矛盾说法更加明确。

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译自英文原文。

持续报道第 60 天

7 篇报道226 家媒体483 个来源83 个视频

完整报道
10 天无进展18 天无进展5 天无进展
  • 暂无标注日期的事件
  1. 第 1 次更新伊朗对美国说：解除制裁、撤回军队，否则海峡继续关闭
  2. 第 2 次更新霍尔木兹海峡一人遇难：Minoan Dignity 遭袭，海峡控制权受考验
  3. 第 3 次更新美伊协议到期后霍尔木兹海峡受阻——各方说法相互冲突
  4. 第 4 次更新60天期限已过，协议未签，霍尔木兹海峡仍关闭
  5. 第 5 次更新上午扬言毁灭，夜间称会谈富有成效：纽约三小时会谈后的霍尔木兹交易
  6. 第 6 次更新特朗普拒绝伊朗的霍尔木兹海峡提议，七天倒计时从未启动
  7. 第 7 次更新也门战事致200,000人流离失所，机场遭袭当前位置

自上次报道以来的变化

11 天后

当时

特朗普拒绝伊朗的霍尔木兹海峡提议，七天倒计时从未启动

我们当时说尚无定论的问题

  1. 没有经核实的座位安排说法、没有签署文本，也没有就放宽限制、资产或停火达成核查安排。

    尚无定论

    尚无经核实的签署文本、达成一致的核查安排，也没有厘清关于座位安排的说法。

  2. 美国未接受伊朗提出的任何一份条件清单。

    尚无定论

    有报道称美国回应已送达，但这并不能证明美国接受了伊朗的条件。 7484

  3. 具体的书面安排顺序、商定的停火以及恢复正常航运的日期，均尚未确定。

    尚无定论

    书面安排的先后顺序、商定的停火以及恢复正常航运的日期，均尚未确定；实施顺序和通行控制仍是分歧所在。 71

  4. 调停方能否在11月3日这个期限前拿出一份注明日期的文本，以及船运能否恢复。

    尚无定论

    目前尚无经公开核实的谈判文本，也未证实常规航运已经恢复。11月3日的期限仍在前方。 84

  5. 封锁放宽与油轮数量是否同步变化，或威胁是否会再度出现。

    尚无定论

    没有可比的连续数据能够显示封锁放宽与油轮数量之间的关系。袭击和威胁仍在继续，包括伊朗声称将封锁其称为非法的航线。 79

  6. 调停方能否送达正式回应并重启谈判，以及船只能否恢复常规、安全通行。

    尚无定论

    伊朗官员称已收到正式回应，卡塔尔表示双方仍在接触。谈判会议是否重启、是否达成协议以及是否恢复常规安全通行，均未获证实。 74137

现在

国际移民组织记录了更大范围局势升级期间的201,217名流离失所者。机场伤亡和客机据报改道的情况，比各方对沿海战果的相互矛盾说法更加明确。

一枚导弹落在亚丁机场跑道附近，距一班从开罗飞来的客机预计抵达仅几分钟。也门交通部称，也门航空603航班改道飞往吉达；航站楼已疏散，两架飞机从停机坪移走。目前暂无人员伤亡报告。10月7日，战事再度升级，波及了平民赖以安全抵达目的地的另一条航线。240 281

这种影响比交战方宣告胜利更为真切。也门获国际承认的政府已发起行动，意图收复胡塞武装控制的所有剩余领土。但截至10月8日，尚无独立核实的证据表明胡塞武装对莫哈的控制出现持久逆转，也没有独立确认塔伊兹通往亚丁的主要补给通道已重新开放。与此同时，更大范围升级期间的流离失所人数已超过200,000人。230 242 245

关键事实

  1. 201,217更大范围局势升级期间的流离失所人数 245316
  2. 114,708塔伊兹省的流离失所者 245
  3. 3人死亡哈立德国王机场和艾卜哈机场遇袭 277279
  4. 20%人道主义响应计划的资金到位比例 245

流离失所人数并不等于自10月4日宣布攻势以来新近流离失所的人数。国际移民组织10月7日发布的数据记录了201,217人，其中197,755人自9月1日以来逃离家园。随附的评估报告数据截至10月6日，累计统计则从6月开始。起始日期很重要：这场军事行动加剧了既有危机，并非在四天内造成了全部已记录的流离失所人口。245 316

国家目标，一条受威胁的道路

也门总统领导委员会主席兼武装部队最高统帅拉沙德·阿利米于2026年10月4日在亚丁宣布展开军事行动。沙特支持的政府表示，降级局势的选项已经用尽，并承诺在全国恢复国家权威，包括在萨那恢复。名为“也门黎明”的军事行动是政府已作出的决定。收复全国是行动的目标，并非已经证实的结果。203 249 305

10月7日，阿利米承诺将继续行动，直到国家机构恢复运作、国家完成解放。他说：“我们可能会遇到困难，但不会放弃恢复国家及其机构这一目标。”尚未公布行动完成的时间表，也没有全面说明领土战果。295

塔伊兹展现了这场没有明确期限的行动在街头层面意味着什么。10月4日的报道显示，该市仍由政府控制。法新社援引当地警方和三名也门军方消息人士报道称，胡塞武装占领了萨菲亚，夺取当地警察局、阻断交通，并切断塔伊兹至亚丁的主要补给道路。消息人士称，该市北、东、西三面已承受压力，实际上遭到包围。1 243

路透社10月4日的报道描述的是胡塞武装推进至山顶、逼近连接塔伊兹和亚丁的最后一条道路，而非道路已被彻底切断。各方对孤立局势发展到何种程度说法不一；但没有任何一方的说法能证明胡塞武装已夺取塔伊兹。有关胡塞武装进入位于道路更南端的图尔巴的报道之后，政府于10月5日声称重新掌握主动权，并称该镇内部发生冲突。截至10月8日，仍没有独立证据确认道路已重新开放。249 242

一座城市即使没有易手，生活也可能变得更加艰难。控制补给道路，就能限制人员流动和物资运送，即使政府仍控制城市本身。不过，目前没有关于食品、燃料或人道主义援助被阻断数量的统计，没有确定的替代路线，也没有恢复通行的时间表。

在沿海地区，9月有关胡塞武装夺取莫哈的报道，是此次攻势的背景，并非10月4日发生的新一轮夺城。此后，亲政府武装声称在巴布·曼德布、杜巴卜及其机场和莫哈取得进展。路透社报道称，部队于10月5日抵达莫哈郊区，之后国防部宣布该地失守；路透社10月7日的报道援引也门军方官员和分析人士的话，称这一说法为时过早。胡塞武装否认这些失地说法。232 207 230

截至10月8日的报道仍将这段沿海地带描述为争夺区，部队在数小时内反复撤退和返回。亲政府方面声称在贾巴勒哈巴希取得进展、全面控制卡赫布山脉，但这些说法仍未核实；胡塞武装声称已阻止对巴布·曼德布方向的推进，这一说法同样未获核实。山顶、港口以及威胁过往船只的能力，是不同形式的力量。海军专家评估认为，领土损失可能降低航运威胁，但无法将其消除。251 206 14

对军事数字也需采取同样审慎的态度。陆军发言人马吉德·努扎伊利上校声称，截至10月8日，已实施2,103次精确打击行动，并使1,860名胡塞武装人员“失去战斗力”。这两个数字均未经独立核实；“失去战斗力”并不能说明其中有多少人死亡而非受伤。联军声称自行动开始以来摧毁了324个目标，并在10月7日的一次行动中摧毁82个目标，这两个数字不能相加，因为两者的重合部分未知。205 264 313 271

机场将各方说法转化为平民承受的后果

沙特民航当局承认，10月6日至7日发生的袭击导致利雅得哈立德国王机场和艾卜哈机场出现人员伤亡。哈立德国王机场记录到1人死亡、8人受伤；艾卜哈机场记录到2人死亡、28人受伤。死者分别为哈立德国王机场的一名苏丹籍居民，以及艾卜哈机场的两名女性，一名摩洛哥籍、一名阿尔及利亚籍。伤势从轻微到重伤或危重不等，并报告有财物损失。277 279

吉赞和奈季兰机场报告的3人轻伤，属于10月5日发生的另外两起袭击，并非对利雅得和艾卜哈伤亡数字的另一种估算。反过来说，机场伤亡得到确认，并不意味着胡塞武装声称的每起袭击都属实。叶海亚·萨里声称10月4日导弹和无人机袭击导致利雅得和胡赖斯的沙特阿美设施起火；截至10月8日，仍没有经过确认的损毁情况或伤亡统计。236 249 223

亚丁事件也有尚未厘清的细节。交通部称，至少有两枚弹道导弹和数架携带爆炸物的无人机，其中一枚导弹在603航班进场前落在跑道附近。萨里则称袭击目标是附近巴德尔营地的沙特军事物资，并声称有军官伤亡，但未提供数字。这些伤亡尚未得到确认。240 281 282

《今日印度》10月7日援引FlightAware称，603航班于03:30降落在亚丁机场，这与交通部关于航班改道的说法相矛盾；这一出入至今尚未厘清。《每日电讯报》报道称航班已恢复，交通部则表示机场将继续开放。但这两者都无法证实该航班后来是否抵达，也不能证明截至10月8日机场已完全恢复运营。有证据支持的说法是航班受阻并发生疏散，而非经核实的长期全面关闭，也非经核实的正常运行。283 8 240

需求有期限；军事行动没有

塔伊兹省有114,708名流离失所者，约占国际移民组织统计总数的57%，主要集中在马阿费尔、贾巴勒哈巴希和阿什沙马亚廷。拉赫季省有42,264人，亚丁有20,814人。超过3,700人经海路逃往吉布提，但并未确认这部分人数应作为额外人口计入国内统计总数。245

国际移民组织的新闻稿和流离失所评估报告均记载有201,217人，但对家庭数量的统计不同：新闻稿为33,776户，评估报告为33,535户。这一差异尚未得到解释。10月7日的更新取代了早先新闻稿中“超过184,000人”的统计快照；后者统计的是8月1日至10月4日，与从6月开始累计的总数不能直接比较。245 316 256

家庭的优先需求十分紧迫：35%需要住所，33%需要食物，22%需要现金，十分之一需要保护。人道主义响应计划的资金到位率仅为20%。这些数据反映的是已报告的需求和资金状况，并不能证明援助已送达所有被统计在内的人。245

人们为逃命奔走，却找不到安全的去处。

艾米·波普 245

卫生数据的统计截止日期较早。世界卫生组织10月4日的局势报告记录了截至10月2日、覆盖10个省份的累计数据：自8月6日以来，959人死亡、4,207人受伤。没有平民与战斗人员的分类数据。10月6日，世卫组织将也门紧急响应需求从US$9 million提高到US$31 million，另需为吉布提的难民提供US$700,000——这些是需求金额，并非已收到的资金。363 362

我们曾报道9月23日由中间方斡旋的美伊接近性谈判，以及特朗普9月27日拒绝伊朗附带条件的霍尔木兹提议。之后发生的变化，是双方承认有过正式交涉：伊朗官员称，美国的回应经卡塔尔传递，于9月30日抵达德黑兰。回应内容尚未公开，也没有证据表明地区停火已获接受。这场外交斡旋并未让也门的军事行动停下。74 84

也门自身的外交接触同样未能带来已确定的停战。10月8日的一份政府通报称，驻联合国大使阿卜杜拉·萨阿迪会见了联合国特使汉斯·格伦德贝里，并表示若临时停火不处理根本原因，就无法带来持久和平。定于10月24日在沙特举行的欧盟—海湾阿拉伯国家合作委员会峰会，将讨论地区安全，但并未承诺解决也门问题。284 334 337

对平民而言，衡量局势的标准比胜利宣言简单得多：道路能否通行、飞机能否安全降落、住所和食物是否真正送达。这些都不能等到政府对军事行动结束给出一个没有日期的定义。

播出原貌 45 行
  1. On September 27 we reported Iran’s rejected Hormuz offer. Now Yemen’s fighting has displaced 201,217 people. Airport attacks have killed three and injured 36, while Taiz faces reported supply constraints. Which civilian consequences are established, and which battlefield victories remain only claims?
  2. The 201,217 displaced people belong to the wider escalation, not just the campaign announced on October 4. Nearly all of them—197,755—have fled since September 1. The accompanying cumulative assessment begins in June and carries data through October 6.
  3. The diplomatic history is not a ceasefire now in force. Our September 23 report described roughly three hours of mediated American–Iranian proximity discussions and uncertainty over direct meetings. Our September 27 report described a rejected conditional shipping offer. Neither establishes an agreed halt to Yemen’s current campaign.
  4. Rashad al-Alimi, chairman of Yemen’s Presidential Leadership Council and armed-forces supreme commander, launched operations from Aden on October 4. The Saudi-backed, internationally recognised government’s objective is to recover remaining Houthi-held territory and restore state institutions nationwide, including in Sanaa.
  5. The campaign is called Dawn of Yemen, or Fajr al-Yemen. Its name and objective were reiterated on October 5, after de-escalation options were described as exhausted. Launching the operation is an established decision; accomplishing its national objective is not an established outcome.
  6. The government renewed its commitment on October 7 to continue until state institutions were restored and the country’s liberation completed. That is an open-ended commitment to fight, not a ceasefire or deadline. Differing translations of the October 4 address do not establish different military orders.
  7. Taiz can be isolated without being captured. Yemen’s third-largest city remained government-held in the October 4 accounts, but its main supply connection runs toward Aden. With pressure already from the north, east and west, losing that connection threatens movement and supplies.
  8. One account described Houthi forces taking al-Safiya, seizing its police station, halting traffic and cutting the road. Another described hilltop advances toward the last connection rather than a completed cut. Both concerned isolation, not a verified Houthi capture of Taiz.
  9. Al-Turbah, south of Taiz on the Aden road, also experienced reported Houthi entry on October 4. Government forces claimed renewed initiative the next day while clashes continued inside the town. By October 8, the road’s reopening was not independently confirmed.
  10. The practical danger is restricted supplies and civilian movement even while the city remains government-held. There is no measured quantity of blocked food, fuel or humanitarian deliveries, no established replacement supply route and no timetable for restoring traffic.
  11. Mokha’s claimed recovery did not become a verified victory. Government forces reached its outskirts on October 5 before the city’s fall was announced. By October 7, that claim was described as premature. The Houthis disputed the reversals and maintained that their September gains remained intact.
  12. The reported Houthi seizure of Mokha and nearby coastal positions occurred in September, not newly on October 4. Government-aligned Southern Giants and National Shield formations later claimed gains around Bab al-Mandab, Dhubab, its airport and Mokha.
  13. Dhubab and the coastal strip still had accounts of withdrawals and returns within hours. Government-aligned statements claimed high-ground gains in Jabal Habashi and full control of Kahboub. Opposing statements described advances toward Bab al-Mandab as stopped. Neither battlefield account was independently verified.
  14. A hilltop gain is not control of a port, and neither automatically makes vessels safe. Territorial losses could reduce the Houthi threat to Red Sea shipping without eliminating it. The October 4 estimate that the government controlled 70% of Yemen was neither a verified control map nor a population measure.
  15. The latest army accounting claims 2,103 precision targeting operations and 1,860 Houthis neutralised. Neither figure is independently verified. Neutralised does not specify how many were killed rather than wounded, so 1,860 cannot be presented as confirmed deaths or a civilian toll.
  16. The earlier October 5 accounting claimed 1,122 operations and 1,747 people neutralised. These are successive military assertions, not independently documented losses. The latest statement came from army spokesman Colonel Majed al-Nuzaili, whose name is also rendered Majid al-Nuzayli.
  17. The coalition’s October 5 accounting described 100 fighter jets and 324 destroyed targets. A separate October 7 operation claimed 82 targets, including 11 missile stores in Saada. Whether those 82 overlap with the earlier 324 is unknown; adding them would invent a total.
  18. The later targeting account covered Saada, Hodeidah, al-Jawf and Marib, including command, communications and weapons facilities. A naval account described strikes on weapons depots, explosive-boat stores and mines in Hodeidah, with imminent attacks purportedly foiled. Those remain coalition claims, not independently verified battle-damage findings.
  19. The claimed October 4 attacks on Aramco facilities in Riyadh and Khurais have no confirmed damage or casualty accounting through October 8. Saudi Arabia had not immediately commented. Circulated smoke footage dated to the previous day cannot independently establish the claimed October 4 strikes.
  20. The October 5 assertions extended to a Rabigh refinery, airports and military sites in Asir, Najran and Jizan. Claimed retaliation figures—50 Saudi strikes in 12 hours, then 60 in 24 hours and 1,576 since escalation—are unverified. So is an earlier claim of two injuries from Saudi strikes.
  21. Airport casualties are more firmly established than those oil-site claims. Attacks on October 6–7 killed one person and injured eight at King Khalid airport, and killed two and injured 28 at Abha: three deaths and 36 injuries across the two locations.
  22. A Sudanese resident was killed at King Khalid. Its wounded included five Saudis, two Egyptian residents and one Pakistani. At Abha, the dead were two women, one Moroccan and one Algerian; the injured included Saudis and Bangladeshi and Filipino residents. Injuries ranged from minor to serious or critical, with material damage reported.
  23. Jazan and Najran experienced a different pair of attacks on October 5, causing three minor injuries and material damage. That number does not contradict the Riyadh–Abha tally. Brief Riyadh air-traffic disruption also occurred, alongside a claimed missile interception north of the city.
  24. The coalition threatened punishment for attacks on civilian facilities and described tracking a launch platform over Sanaa. Confirmed airport casualties and disruption do not establish every claimed strike on an oil installation, military base or launch platform.
  25. A missile reportedly landed near Aden’s runway minutes before a civilian flight was due to arrive. Before dawn on October 7, at least two ballistic missiles and several explosive drones were described in the attack. The government account records disruption to the runway and passenger terminal.
  26. Yemenia flight 603 from Cairo had its landing cancelled and diverted to Jeddah in the government account. The terminal was evacuated, and Yemenia and Air Aden aircraft were moved from the tarmac. A conflicting tracking account places the flight at Aden at 03:30; that discrepancy remains unresolved.
  27. No immediate casualties were reported in the airport account. A competing description named Saudi military supplies at nearby Badr camp as the target and alleged officer casualties without figures. Those casualties are unconfirmed and do not erase the disruption to civilian travel.
  28. Aden was not verified as experiencing a prolonged total closure. Flights were described as resumed or continuing, and the airport was promised to remain open. But neither that assurance nor scheduled movements independently establish full recovery or the subsequent arrival of flight 603.
  29. Taiz accounts for 114,708 displaced people, about 57% of the total, principally in Al Ma’afer, Jabal Habashi and Ash Shamayatayn. Lahj records 42,264; Aden, 20,814; Abyan, 9,030; and Al Hodeidah, 8,244.
  30. More than 3,700 people have fled by sea to Djibouti. That figure is not established as an additional caseload to add to the domestic total. Crossing a border and appearing in a displacement assessment are not necessarily mutually exclusive counts.
  31. Other reported displacement counts are Hadramawt, 2,478; Shabwah, 1,188; Marib, 1,080; Al Maharah, 936; and Ad Dali’, 475. The listed governorate figures should not be forced to sum exactly to the headline total.
  32. The people total agrees, but the household totals do not: 33,776 in the release, against 33,535 in the accompanying update. The discrepancy is unreconciled. The update’s separate August 1–October 6 window gives approximately 200,161 people and 33,359 households.
  33. An earlier snapshot recorded more than 184,000 displaced between August 1 and October 4. During September 27–October 3, 21,798 people, or 3,633 households, moved at least once—26% above the previous week. October 4 added 6,474 people, or 1,079 households.
  34. Small differences also persist in earlier records. For August 1–October 3, the public dataset gave approximately 174,097 people and 29,023 households; the weekly document gave about 174,145 people and a June-start cumulative total of 175,201. These overlapping snapshots cannot be added together or collapsed into a single before-and-after comparison. The October 7 assessment is the later update.
  35. Shelter is the reported priority for 35%, food for 33%, and cash for 22%. One in ten cite protection. Those figures identify needs, not assistance delivered. Displacement was expected to rise further while Yemen’s humanitarian response plan was only 20% funded.
  36. The humanitarian response plan’s 20% funding level leaves an immediate gap between families’ needs and available assistance. The appeal calls for a roof, food, safety, donor funding and humanitarian access. It does not establish that new money or access has been secured.
  37. The health register records 959 deaths and 4,207 injuries across ten governorates as of October 2, cumulatively since August 6. Together that is 5,166 reported casualties, including 685 new casualties during September 27–October 2. No civilian-versus-combatant breakdown is available.
  38. The earlier September 19–26 assessment recorded 4,481 cumulative casualties, including 838 deaths. The October 4 health report’s separate displacement figure of 197,906 does not replace the later October 7 assessment. Rounded warnings of nearly 1,000 deaths and almost 198,000 displaced do not establish a newly updated register.
  39. Immediate health-response requirements rose from nine million to 31 million US dollars, with another 700,000 dollars needed for refugees in Djibouti. These are requirements, not confirmed receipts. Increased casualties and displacement place more pressure on an already overstretched health system.
  40. There is no verified count here of conflict-damaged or closed health facilities, interrupted services or money actually secured. The scaled-up-response announcement was dated September 23; the October 6 release concerned the funding gap. Increased need is established, not a complete hospital-damage accounting.
  41. The October 8 meeting between Yemen’s UN ambassador Abdullah al-Saadi and UN envoy Hans Grundberg produced no established truce. The dated government account places the meeting that day; an earlier October 7 date is not independently confirmed. No dated next meeting is established.
  42. The government’s position distinguishes peace from a temporary pause that leaves the conflict’s root causes unresolved. It seeks restored state institutions and a comprehensive, sustainable settlement, rejecting militia control of those institutions. Those conditions do not amount to an agreed ceasefire.
  43. The second EU–Gulf Cooperation Council summit is scheduled for October 24 in Saudi Arabia. Regional security is a central subject after attacks on Saudi infrastructure, alongside broader proposed discussions of connectivity, trade, economic cooperation, energy and mobility.
  44. King Salman’s summit invitation reached Qatar’s emir, but the calendar promises no Yemen agreement. The answer to the opening question is that displacement and airport casualties are established consequences; durable coastal victories, road reopening, full airport recovery and assistance reaching all families remain unresolved.
  45. The government has committed to continue Dawn of Yemen until its objectives are achieved, without a completion date. Against that open-ended timetable stand 201,217 displaced people and a humanitarian response plan only 20% funded.

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