商业 · 银行合规

美国银行将收入置于首位，现被罚逾12.1亿美元

该行自身的测试揭示了被漏掉的警示信号。该行的承认及执法命令记录了多年来的报告延误，而整改是否有效仍有待证明。

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  1. 第 1 次更新美国银行将收入置于首位，现被罚逾12.1亿美元当前位置

美国银行自身的测试显示，其金融犯罪监控系统漏掉了需要报告的活动。尽管如此，该行仍未消除这些弱点。如今，该行已承认故意违反联邦反洗钱法；2026年10月13日宣布的民事罚款及制裁和解金额合计超过12.1亿美元。最严厉的认定指向管理层的选择，而非系统故障。31 1

这些问题出现时，美国银行优先考虑收入，并尽量减少对其所需合规资源的影响。

FinCEN同意令 31

这句话将一场代价高昂的合规失误，转化为对该行如何处理警告更为重要的叙述。内部测试、升级处理和外部疑虑都未能促成充分整改。2024年12月，货币监理署（OCC）发布停止令后，重要整改工作仍未完成。该行仍受这项先前命令约束。31 6

罚款的计算方式很重要。金融犯罪执法局（FinCEN）评定罚款12亿美元。OCC评定罚款7.5亿美元，但支付该笔款项可抵扣FinCEN评定的罚款，因此根据FinCEN命令，净额应付4.5亿美元。OCC的金额不是应在12亿美元之外另行累加的一笔罚款。31 7

外国资产控制办公室（OFAC）另行同意以11,662,930美元了结制裁案件。将上述金额合计且不重复计算，结果为1,211,662,930美元。财政部称，这项协调行动是其历史上第三大罚款；OCC评定的金额则是该机构历史上最高的罚款。10 1 6

这些是已评定的民事罚款和双方同意的和解条款，并非监管机构仅仅在寻求的处罚。美国银行承认其故意违反《银行保密法》，涉及反洗钱项目、对外国金融机构代理账户所作的规定审查，以及可疑活动报告。相比之下，OFAC案件是就涉嫌违反制裁规定的行为了结潜在民事责任。两者均未构成刑事定罪，现有记录也未证实司法部采取了相应的刑事行动。31 8

遮蔽警示信号的门槛

除非某项具体认定另有说明，FinCEN的相关时期至少从2018年1月1日持续至2025年7月1日。超过50亿美元的可疑活动未能及时发现并报告，其中包括涉及国家安全或其他优先风险的超过10亿美元。较小的金额包含在较大的金额之中。31

可疑活动报告（SAR）会向调查人员提示可能存在不当行为，但并不能证明这些行为确实发生。因此，50亿美元并不意味着每一美元都是犯罪所得，也不意味着所有相关活动永远都未被报告。问题在于该行未能及时发出必要警示。

一个核心弱点是该行自有的Event Processor系统。该系统将警报合并为事件组，通常需要达到20分的风险分数才会启动调查，除非触发自动升级规则。这一门槛依赖相关方的判断，缺乏充分的实证依据。内部测试反复发现，低于该门槛的活动中存在应报告的情况；在若干时期，略低于20分的事件组产生SAR的比例高于达到该门槛的事件组。31

该系统最初采用13个月的时间窗口，后来缩短了窗口，并将较早的警报从评分中剔除。风险因素的权重设置不足，而在缺乏充分治理的情况下，重新评分和抑制处理可能将其分值归零。系统对可转让票据存款、信用卡活动及贸易型洗钱情形的覆盖有限。通常只有在执法部门或另一家银行提出疑虑后，外部或人工触发的升级才会使相关活动进入调查程序。31

简单来说，该行过度依赖他人先发现问题。相关活动可能长时间累积却无人调查，而最终提交的一些报告对调查人员帮助有限。即使出现升级情况，该行的客户审查也未能充分应对警示信号。31

相关风险包括中国洗钱网络、欺诈、高风险国际电汇，以及通过贸易进行的潜在洗钱活动；这些活动与美国西南边境有密切联系，其中包括翻新旧车。在线汽车拍卖客户会进行第三方付款，或使用可能与毒品犯罪所得有关的支付工具。这些是需要审查的特定警示模式，并不能证明所有此类客户或跨境商业活动都涉及犯罪。31

2023年12月，该行根据相关群组的特征，将调查门槛降至10或12分。随后进行的有限范围2024年回溯审查发现，近8,900份应报而未报的可疑活动报告（SAR），涉及近40亿美元的活动。同一命令也将这次审查描述为提交了8,000多份报告，总额约39.6亿美元。这是对同一次审查的两种重叠描述，并非两项发现，应避免将其相加。之后提交报告说明该行最终进行了报告，却无法弥补延误所造成的时间损失。31

货币监理署（OCC）发现了更广泛的弱点：对数万亿美元交易的监控存在缺陷；可疑活动可能多年未被上报；员工专业能力和培训不足；审计失灵；管理层淡化缺陷。数万亿美元指的是监控不足的交易范围，并非已证实被洗钱的金额。6

罚款不等于修复

另一起制裁案件涉及2021年9月18日至2025年4月24日期间的475起涉嫌违规，相关制裁项目针对俄罗斯、白俄罗斯、伊朗、缅甸、索马里、毒品犯罪及全球恐怖主义。技术和人为错误、观察名单更新延迟以及警报抑制，导致涉及受封锁银行的款项得以通过。该行还未优先处理与被封锁人员姓名及出生日期完全匹配的情况。10

美国外国资产控制办公室（OFAC）将相关行为归类为非严重，但大部分未主动自我披露：413起涉嫌违规未自我披露，62起进行了自我披露。OFAC指出了鲁莽行为、此前发出的警示函，以及对制裁目标造成的损害，尤其是在俄罗斯入侵乌克兰之后。和解金额未因整改或配合而从基础罚款中扣减。“非严重”是执法分类，并不代表认定行为没有危害。10

美国银行的回应从承担责任开始：“金融犯罪合规是严肃的事情，我们有责任把它做好。”该行称，已在技术方面投入数十亿美元，安排数千名员工打击金融犯罪，并且已基本完成要求的整改工作。这些投入是该行自己的说法；它们本身不能证明检测有效或报告及时。17

该行表示，将在2026年第三季度业绩中计入一笔不可抵税的12亿美元支出，使净利润每股减少约17美分。这是已宣布的会计处理，并非已完成的盈利结果，也不代表股价下跌。该支出约相当于其2025年官方净利润305.09亿美元的3.9%。这一比较只是说明规模，不能证明其具有威慑作用。61 67

FinCEN现要求独立顾问查找漏报的可疑活动，并评估监控、客户及外国代理行尽职调查，以及反洗钱数据治理。只有经FinCEN批准，才可使用OCC现有顾问或回溯审查的成果。31

对于SAR回溯审查，该行必须在命令签署后60天内提议一名合格顾问，并计划在30天内聘用；FinCEN可否决人选。聘用顾问后150天内须提交范围报告。详细回溯审查报告须在提交范围报告后18个月内完成，且最迟不得晚于2028年12月；此后90天内须补交任何进一步要求的SAR。监控有效性报告须在审查完成后45天内提交，且最迟不得晚于2028年7月。这些最终期限只具体到月份，并未指定具体日期。31

已知

  • 净额4.5亿美元的FinCEN款项须在FinCEN签署后十个日历日内支付，签署当天不计入期限。 31

未知

  • 现有签署日期栏为空。10月13日是公告日期，并非经核实的签署日期；因此无法确定日历付款期限，也无法确认款项已支付。

后续

  • 应关注顾问是否受聘，以及独立调查结果能否证明整改后的控制措施可以及时发现可疑活动并生成有用报告。

执法事实已经确定，整改则尚未完成。开出支票能够履行财务义务。找出该行漏掉的内容，并证明今后不会继续漏报，才是更严峻的考验。

本报道的来源

主要文件包括财政部公告 1 5、OCC新闻稿及罚款命令 6 7、OFAC和解页面及执法公告 8 10 42，以及FinCEN公告、执法页面和同意令 15 27 31 58。

提供的报道来源包括SBS 2、彭博电视台 3、PBS《新闻一小时》 4、CNBC 9、American Banker 11、美联社 12、CNN 13、The Financial Current 14、Axios 16、路透社 17、金融时报 18、合众国际社 19、福克斯商业频道 20、InvestmentNews 21、雅虎财经 22、ABC新闻 23、今日美国 24、IBTimes Australia 25、Fincrime Central 26、Newsweek 48、半岛电视台 49、BBC 59、AlphaPilot 60、TipRanks 61、The Asian Banker 62、Futubull 63和Firstpost 74。

财务材料包括美国证券交易委员会（SEC）披露文件 50 56 67 72、银行业绩及投资者文件 52 53 55 57，以及来自BusinessQuant 51、Stockrow 54、MarketScreener 64 66、雅虎财经 65 70、Seeking Alpha 68、Eulerpool 69、PublicNow 71和Chartmill 73的补充财务参考资料。

所提供的书目还包括用于补充参考、但未用于确定本次执法行动相关事实的材料：Eric Garland的帖子 28；FinCEN索引 29 30；OCC参考页面、文件及公告 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39；财政部公告索引 40；OFAC参考页面 41 44 46；以及财政部项目、审计和风险评估文件 43 45 47。

播出原貌 37 行
  1. Bank of America failed to report more than five billion dollars in suspicious transactions on time. America's second-largest bank has admitted willful violations of federal anti-money-laundering law. Its civil penalties and sanctions settlement total more than one point two one billion dollars. Can the bank now catch the activity its own controls let through?
  2. The bank admitted failures in its anti-money-laundering program, checks on foreign financial institutions, and suspicious-activity reporting. The violations covered at least January first, 2018, through July first, 2025, with some findings covering more specific periods.
  3. Those foreign institutions used correspondent accounts, which let one financial institution provide banking services to another. The bank had to check the risks those relationships carried. Suspicious-activity reports alert investigators to possible wrongdoing. A suspicious transaction can warrant a report before anyone proves a crime.
  4. More than five billion dollars in activity went without timely detection and reporting. Within that total, more than one billion dollars involved national-security or other priority risks. Investigators lost the chance to receive those warnings promptly.
  5. Treasury announced the coordinated enforcement actions on October thirteenth, 2026. FinCEN, its financial-crime watchdog, assessed a one point two billion dollar civil penalty. The bank regulator known as the OCC assessed seven hundred fifty million dollars.
  6. The OCC's seven hundred fifty million dollars counts toward FinCEN's assessment, leaving four hundred fifty million dollars payable to FinCEN. Treasury's sanctions office, OFAC, separately settled for eleven million, six hundred sixty-two thousand, nine hundred thirty dollars.
  7. Treasury called the combined action its third-largest penalty. The OCC assessment is the largest in that agency's history. The penalties have been assessed, and the sanctions settlement has been agreed.
  8. FinCEN found that Bank of America put revenue first while limiting the burden on its compliance resources. Managers left weaknesses in place despite internal testing and warnings. Outside concerns also failed to produce adequate repairs.
  9. The bank's own tests repeatedly found activity that warranted reporting but fell below its investigation threshold. In several periods, groups just below the cutoff produced a higher share of suspicious-activity reports than groups that cleared it.
  10. The bank's Event Processor monitoring system grouped alerts and generally required twenty risk points before an investigation. Automatic promotion could bypass that cutoff. The bank lowered the threshold to ten or twelve points in December 2023, depending on the group's characteristics.
  11. The original cutoff rested on stakeholder judgment without enough testing to support it. The system initially counted alerts within a thirteen-month window, later shortened, and dropped older alerts from scoring. Risk factors carried inadequate weights. Rescoring and suppression rules could wipe out factors without sufficient controls.
  12. The system had limited coverage of check-like instruments, credit-card activity and possible laundering through trade. Law enforcement or another bank often raised concerns before activity reached investigation. External or manual alerts frequently supplied the twenty points needed to trigger action.
  13. Activity could sit uninvestigated for long periods, and some eventual reports gave investigators little useful information. The bank also failed to respond adequately when staff escalated warning signs involving high-risk customers.
  14. A limited review in 2024 uncovered nearly eight thousand nine hundred missed suspicious-activity reports, covering nearly four billion dollars in transactions. The bank conducted that lookback after changing the monitoring thresholds in December 2023.
  15. The same review led to more than eight thousand filings covering about three point nine six billion dollars. Those figures describe one review. The later filings show that previously missed activity eventually reached investigators, but they couldn't restore the time lost.
  16. Potential laundering through trade had a substantial southwest-border connection, including activity involving salvaged vehicles. FinCEN also identified risks involving Chinese money-laundering networks and fraud. These findings concern suspicious financial activity that the bank's controls failed to handle adequately.
  17. High-risk international wires included activity involving Georgia and Belarus. Online auto-auction customers made third-party payments or used financial instruments potentially connected to narcotics proceeds. The bank's checks on those customers failed to respond adequately to red flags, even after concerns were escalated.
  18. Trade-based money laundering uses commercial transactions to move or disguise money. Here, regulators identified potential laundering involving vehicle-related trade. Suspicious patterns required investigation and reporting without treating every vehicle buyer or cross-border transaction as criminal.
  19. The OCC found weaknesses across a much larger transaction universe. Deficient monitoring covered trillions of dollars in transactions, and potentially suspicious activity sometimes went without escalation for years.
  20. The OCC found late reports involving billions of dollars, many showing money-laundering indicators. Compliance officers and staff lacked sufficient expertise and training, and the audit function failed. Management minimized deficiencies and left significant corrective work unfinished after a December 2024 order.
  21. The bank remains subject to that earlier cease-and-desist order. The trillions describe transactions exposed to deficient monitoring. Regulators' findings about possible laundering concern suspicious activity within that much larger universe.
  22. OFAC's separate settlement covers four hundred seventy-five apparent sanctions violations between September 2021 and April 2025. The underlying transactions were worth about fourteen point eight million dollars. The settlement resolves potential civil liability for those apparent violations.
  23. The affected sanctions programs targeted Russia, Belarus, Iran, Burma and Somalia, as well as narcotics and global terrorism. Payments involving blocked banks slipped through because of technical and human errors, delayed updates and suppressed alerts.
  24. Four hundred thirteen apparent violations weren't voluntarily disclosed, while sixty-two were. OFAC classified the conduct as non-egregious, its formal severity category. The settlement received no reduction from the base penalty for remediation or cooperation.
  25. The bank failed to prioritize exact name-and-birth-date matches to blocked people. Vendor and system problems delayed watchlist updates. Human errors also affected two business accounts linked to blocked people. OFAC cited recklessness, prior cautionary letters and harm to sanctions objectives, particularly after Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
  26. Bank of America says financial-crime compliance is serious and it's responsible for getting it right. It says it has invested billions in technology and dedicated thousands of employees to fighting financial crime. It says its team is far along with the required repairs.
  27. The bank also points to its support for law enforcement and high volumes of suspicious-activity reports. The enforcement findings focus on whether necessary reports arrive promptly and contain information investigators can use.
  28. The bank says it will record a one point two billion dollar, non-tax-deductible charge in third-quarter results. That would reduce net income by about seventeen cents per share. Its 2025 net income was thirty point five zero nine billion dollars.
  29. Second-quarter 2026 net income was nine point zero seven four billion dollars. First-half net income, including that quarter, was seventeen point six five eight billion. The announced charge equals about three point nine percent of last year's earnings. Repair costs are already included in the bank's expenses.
  30. FinCEN now requires independent consultants to search for missed activity and test monitoring, customer checks and foreign-correspondent checks. They must also review how the bank manages its anti-money-laundering data. Existing OCC consultants or lookbacks can serve certain purposes only with FinCEN's approval.
  31. The reviews target priority risks including southwest-border activity, cartels and narcotics, Iran and Russia. OFAC's commitments also require training, testing and audit, along with continuing communication and cooperation.
  32. The bank must propose a qualified lookback consultant within sixty days of execution, with an intended hire within thirty days. FinCEN can veto the choice. A report defining the review's scope is due within one hundred fifty days of engagement.
  33. The detailed lookback report is due within eighteen months of that scope report. Further required suspicious-activity reports must be filed within ninety days after the lookback report.
  34. The monitoring effectiveness report is due within forty-five days after that review finishes, and no later than July 2028. The lookback report must arrive no later than December 2028. The order specifies those months without naming particular days.
  35. Other final reports on customer checks and data governance generally have deadlines within a year of consultant engagement, subject to the required approvals.
  36. The remaining four hundred fifty million dollars is due within ten calendar days after FinCEN signs, excluding the signing day. The signature dates are blank, so the calendar deadline is unclear. We don't know whether the bank has paid or engaged the consultants.
  37. Independent reviews still have to show whether the repaired controls catch suspicious activity promptly and produce useful reports. The bank must search for activity missed before, file the required reports and demonstrate that its controls work, under continuing oversight extending into 2028.

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