司法 · 联储翻修项目

联储审查未发现移交刑事调查的理由；Trump 仍要求 Powell 下台

监察长记录了成本控制失效和多年的延误，但未发现移交刑事调查的理由。Trump 仍要求 Powell 辞职。

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  1. 第 1 次更新联储审查未发现移交刑事调查的理由；Trump 仍要求 Powell 下台当前位置

美联储监察长发现，总部翻修项目存在严重失误，但没有理由将杰 Jerome Powell 或其他任何人移交刑事调查。Donald Trump 却仍要求 Powell 辞职。一份记录成本失控情况的报告，成了又一次试图罢免某位官员的借口，尽管报告并未证实其有刑事不当行为。5 6

监察长 Michael Horowitz 的评估报告得出的核心结论，正是这一区别：成本管理不善、造成高昂开支已得到证实；报告没有发现刑事不当行为或行政不当行为。负责货币政策的机构未能确保获得其施工合同本应提供的成本确定性。这一失误本身以及账单金额，都不足以证明发生了犯罪。5

评估报告写道：“在评估期间，我们从未发现有合理理由相信发生了违反联邦刑法的行为，因而需要依照《监察长法》移交美国司法部长处理。”报告还称：“我们在评估期间未发现行政不当行为。”这些结论并非法院判决，也不代表认可项目中的每项决策，或解决了所有可能的法律问题。5

此次审查应 Powell 于2025年7月提出的请求而开展，历时一年多。报告印刷日期为2026年9月29日，公开发布日为9月30日，二者指的是同一份评估报告，而非两份报告。官方文件有120个编号页码，尽管一些公开报道称其有121页。5 14

关键事实

  1. $1.317bn2020年2月获批的翻修预算 5
  2. $2.381bn2024年12月获批的翻修预算 5
  3. 2027年12月修订后的施工完工预计时间，并非保证 5

迟迟未能敲定的价格上限

该项目涉及华盛顿的 Eccles 大楼和1951年总部大楼。施工于2022年7月开始；原计划预计施工阶段于2024年第二季度结束。修订后的预计完工时间为2027年12月。与此同时，获批翻修预算从$1.317 billion升至$2.381 billion，截至2026年8月，后者仍是获批预算。在这两项总额中，施工预算从$921 million升至$2.018 billion。这些是预算，并非已经支付的金额。5

公开报道中的价格数字需要谨慎看待。彭博社报道为$2.4 billion，CBS 使用$2.5 billion，PBS 则称接近$2.5 billion。另有一项范围更广、涵盖多个周期的资本预算，2024年达到$2.455 billion；联储后来在公开解释中提到约$2.46 billion。范围和四舍五入的差异有助于解释这些数字为何不同，但并未明确厘清每个已发布数字的计算依据和日期。此处采用准确的翻修项目预算条目更为有用。119 8 120 5 137

理事会选择了风险型施工经理合同，这种安排旨在将实质性的成本风险转移给管理方，并设定最高保证价格。然而，监察长发现，理事会“屡次偏离成本管理条款”。到2026年7月，施工开始四年后，理事会仍未转移重大风险、取得成本确定性或设定总体上限。5

一项早期限制实际上被弃置。2020年4月，项目团队为建筑和工程公司设定了$857 million的设计成本限制，这与获批的施工预算不同。该限制既未更新，也未执行，施工经理和业主代表都未获告知。业主代表也缺少预算和详细投标信息，无法独立核实成本。5

从2022年7月至2025年12月，理事会在2025年12月30日正式要求提供最高保证价格之前，已授予69份分包工程合同，总额达$1.978 billion。这些是施工合同，并非管理费或现金支出。管理方于2026年1月提交了一份$2.135 billion的施工成本提案。这是承包商迟交的估价和价格上限提案，并非理事会首次提出的总预算：自2020年2月起，理事会就已有获批预算。5

管理方的费用仍按工程金额的2.95 percent计算，而非固定且设有上限的费用。成本和工期责任划分不清，超过$100 million的工程包增额也未得到充分上报。实际上，理事会不断承诺开展工程，却没有建立其合同中约定要取得的项目整体保障。5

机电和管道工程体现了成本规模。两份核心结构和外壳工程包于2022年3月估价$178 million，随后在2023年7月和10月以$539 million授标；每份工程包都收到两份投标。两份室内系统工程包的估价从$28 million升至2025年6月授标时的$155 million。四份工程包合计约$694 million，比早期估价高出约$488 million。5

通货膨胀是一个因素，但不足以解释这一情况。监察长将相关时期的情况与生产者价格涨幅作了比较，涨幅约为16 percent和19 percent，远低于工程包增幅。这些指数并不能精确计算该项目受通胀影响的程度，理事会也没有提供针对该项目的分析。2023年1月，设计方案从以开放式办公空间为主改为以封闭式办公室为主，也使室内设计完成时间延迟了21个月。5

评估报告还驳斥了另一种广受关注的解释：大理石、水景、花园露台、主席专用电梯和天窗“并未对施工成本增加造成实质性影响”。这并不意味着所有这些设施都不存在或无需花费。报告的意思是，主要问责问题在于合同管控、投标、设计决策和治理，而不只是显眼的装饰。5 8

刑事调查早已结束

监察长的评估与司法部对翻修项目及 Powell 在2025年6月向参议院银行委员会作证一事所进行的调查是分开的。2026年3月3日的听证会上，检察官 George A. Massucco-LaTaif 被问及是否有翻修欺诈或刑事不当行为的证据。据对解封听证记录的报道，他回答说：“我们目前还不知道。”126

美国首席联邦地区法官 James E. Boasberg 在3月11日签署、3月13日解封的一份意见书中撤销了传票。他写道：“政府没有提出任何证据证明 Powell 犯有任何罪行，唯一例外是他令总统不满。”他还认定，有大量证据表明，传票意在施压 Powell，迫使他支持降息或辞职。118 52

4月24日，美国联邦检察官 Jeanine Pirro 表示，她已指示办公室在监察长开展审查期间结束调查，并保留在事实需要时重启调查的可能性。6月11日的法院意见书记载：“政府没有提出上诉，而是结束了调查。”法院驳回了政府要求撤销传票裁决的申请。阻止传票和结束调查是先后发生的两件事，并非相互矛盾的结果；当时没有提出任何起诉。122 112

Powell 的主席任期于5月结束，Kevin M. Warsh 随后出任主席，但 Powell 仍是理事。9月30日，Trump 表示，Powell“应该被迫辞职”，否则政府就应以“腐败或无能”为由起诉他。他要求司法部长 Todd Blanche 研究这份评估报告并决定如何回应。Trump 称该项目“看不到尽头”，但没有提及报告预计工程将于2027年12月完工；不过，该日期并无保证。14 156 5

Pirro 的办公室表示，正在审查新收到的报告。审查并不意味着已宣布重启调查。截至10月1日，没有公开文件证实调查已正式重启，也没有确认提出新的指控。这是公开记录所能说明的范围，并不保证检察官下一步会作何决定。14 6 112

问责现在需要可衡量的成果

理事会接受了七项建议：取得最高保证价格，或采用另一种性价比最佳的完工方案；设定成本和工期指标；按照合同确定管理方费用；明确监督和报告机制；审计已授标成本；核对合同约定服务与实际收到服务的情况，并评估是否应退款；以及统一对未来重大项目的监督方式。5

Warsh 在9月29日的回应中，决定继续由总务管理局担任项目主管，并立即生效，向他和理事会汇报。这是对剩余工程的监督安排，并不意味着联储将项目所有权转交出去。他承诺尽快完成价格上限谈判，制定固定的预算和工期指标，并聘请独立审计员“核实迄今所有已授标成本的准确性及合规情况”。审计或价格谈判都没有设定明确的完成期限。16 14

理事会还打算与总务管理局一起，对未收到的服务进行估值并寻求补救，可能包括退款或抵免。目前尚未确认追回任何款项。监察长计划每季度跟进，直至各项建议得到落实。现在的有效检验标准是：理事会能否取得真正的成本上限、核实成本、追回任何应付款项，并按照明确的指标交付项目。要求某人辞职回答不了这些问题。16 44

来源及支持性参考资料

广播报道和最初报道：1 2 3 4

评估报告、同期报道及相关报道：5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29

调查报道及背景资料：30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69

其他参考资料，并非全部用于支持本文论点：70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109

法院记录、调查报道及报告发布当天的报道：110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126

其他支持性资料和背景资料，并非全部用于支持本文论点：127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162

播出原貌 18 行
  1. Donald Trump demanded Powell’s resignation despite a renovation review finding no grounds for criminal referral. The Federal Reserve’s headquarters construction is projected to finish in December 2027, years after its original target, without a finalized guaranteed maximum price. What failed to control the costs, and what accountability remains unfinished?
  2. The evaluation also identified no administrative misconduct by Powell or other officials. That distinction matters: management and oversight failures contributed to escalating costs, but the review did not substantiate the criminal or administrative-misconduct accusations. This is not a court verdict, an endorsement of every project decision, or a resolution of every conceivable legal issue. The evaluation is dated September 29, 2026, and was publicly announced September 30. Those are different dates for one evaluation. It has 120 numbered pages, not the 121 described in some public accounts. The investigation lasted more than a year, following Jerome Powell’s July 2025 request for a review of the Eccles and 1951 headquarters buildings in Washington.
  3. The approved renovation budget rose from 1.317 billion dollars in February 2020 to 2.381 billion in December 2024. That later amount remained approved as of August 2026. Inside those totals, the construction component increased from 921 million dollars to 2.018 billion. A separate, broader multicycle capital budget increased from 1.378 billion to 2.455 billion dollars. These are different scopes, not interchangeable price tags. None establishes how much cash has already been paid.
  4. Public cost descriptions range from 2.4 billion dollars to 2.5 billion, or nearly 2.5 billion. The Fed’s public explanation later used approximately 2.46 billion. The renovation line is close to the rounded 2.4 billion description; the broader capital figure is close to 2.5 billion. Scope and rounding help explain the range, but the basis and date behind every published figure remain only partly reconciled. Choosing one headline number would hide that uncertainty.
  5. Construction began in July 2022. The February 2020 plan expected the construction phase to finish in the second quarter of 2024. The revised projection is December 2027—not a guaranteed completion date.
  6. The contract was supposed to place meaningful cost risk on the construction manager and establish a guaranteed maximum price. The Board selected this construction-manager-at-risk approach after difficulties with a different contracting approach on its Martin building project. But it repeatedly departed from the new contract’s cost-management provisions. Internal governance was inadequate for the project’s scale and complexity, and available cost-control actions went unused. The Board hired the construction manager as constructor in March 2022, after two design phases, then began construction without that manager’s project-level estimate. By July 2026, four years after work began, material risk still had not been transferred to the manager, cost certainty had not been obtained, and no overall ceiling had been established. The guaranteed maximum price remained unfinished at the evaluation.
  7. The Board awarded 69 subcontractor work packages totaling 1.978 billion dollars between July 2022 and December 2025 before formally requesting a guaranteed maximum price. That award total excludes approximately 1.49 million dollars in preconstruction services. It is awarded construction work—not construction-manager fees and not a cash-disbursement total. The formal price request came on December 30, 2025. In January 2026, the manager submitted a proposed construction cost of 2.135 billion dollars, including 2.078 billion in awarded construction costs and estimates for remaining work across 84 packages. This was the manager’s construction-cost and price-ceiling proposal, not the Board’s first total project budget. The approved total budget had existed since February 2020.
  8. An 857-million-dollar design limitation had also gone unenforced. The project team conveyed it to the architecture and engineering firm in April 2020, but did not update it or require the firm to design to it. Neither the construction manager nor the owner’s representative was told of the limitation. It was distinct from the approved 921-million-dollar construction budget. The owner’s representative also lacked the project budget and detailed bid information needed for independent cost validation. Meanwhile, the manager’s fee remained 2.95 percent of work rather than a fixed, capped fee. Numerous limited-scope awards without a project-wide guaranteed price made the arrangement resemble cost reimbursement instead of an effective transfer of overall cost risk. Those financial incentives and contract failures are not themselves a finding of a federal crime. Responsibility for cost and schedule was unclear. Increases exceeding 100 million dollars on individual packages were not adequately escalated, and the owner’s representative was not asked to independently validate building-systems packages running approximately 500 million above the earlier design estimate.
  9. Two core-and-shell mechanical, electrical and plumbing packages rose from a 178-million-dollar estimate in March 2022 to 539 million in awards in July and October 2023. Using underlying unrounded figures, the increase was 362 million dollars, or 203 percent. Each package received two bids, not three. Two interior fit-out systems packages rose from a 28-million-dollar estimate to 155 million awarded in June 2025—a reported 454 percent increase. Together, the four packages totaled approximately 694 million dollars, about 488 million, or 237 percent, above the earlier estimate. Three of the four lacked three bids; those three totaled 624 million dollars. Within the systems work, plumbing and heating, ventilation and air-conditioning costs rose from 107 million to 346 million dollars. These comparisons overlap. Adding them together would double-count costs.
  10. Inflation contributed, but it did not explain those increases by itself. Producer-price inflation was approximately 16 percent from March 2022 to October 2023, and 19 percent through June 2025—far below the package increases. Those indexes are comparisons, not a precise measurement of inflation’s effect on this particular project. The Board supplied no project-specific inflation analysis. Both inflation and management problems contributed.
  11. A shift to predominantly closed offices delayed interior design completion by 21 months. Drawings developed from 2019 through 2022 assumed predominantly open workspaces. The Board’s January 2023 decision required changes to walls, doors, security, ceiling spaces and building-systems distribution.
  12. The redesign continued through October 2024, delaying substantial design completion and guaranteed-maximum-price negotiations planned for fall 2023. Building-information-model coordination for the 1951 building extended to October 2025. Eccles coordination remained incomplete in the construction manager’s price-proposal narrative. But conspicuous design features were not material drivers of the construction-cost increases: marble, water features, the garden terrace, a private elevator for the chair and skylights. That does not establish that every feature was absent or cost nothing. It places the major accountability questions with bidding, design decisions, contract controls and governance.
  13. The separate criminal investigation was closed—not merely blocked by a judge. It concerned the renovation and Powell’s June 2025 Senate Banking Committee testimony. Powell disclosed grand-jury subpoenas in January 2026. D.C. U.S. Attorney Jeanine Pirro pursued the inquiry. At a March 3 hearing, prosecutor George A. Massucco-LaTaif could not identify evidence of renovation fraud or criminal misconduct. He argued that a 1.2-billion-dollar overrun supplied reason to investigate and that a tip or rumor could justify inquiry. That figure was a prosecutorial argument, not an audited accounting measure or evidence of a crime.
  14. Chief U.S. District Judge James E. Boasberg quashed the subpoenas in an opinion dated March 11 and unsealed March 13. The justifications were thin and unsubstantiated, with essentially zero evidence to suspect Powell of a crime. The court identified extensive evidence that the subpoenas were intended to pressure Powell into supporting lower interest rates or resigning. The concern was criminal investigative machinery being used against a central-bank official over interest rates and his position—not a construction bill establishing wrongdoing.
  15. Pirro closed the investigation on April 24 while the inspector general conducted the evaluation, reserving the option to restart if facts warranted it. Blocking subpoenas and closing an investigation were successive events, not contradictory accounts. The June 11 court decision recorded that the government closed its investigation instead of appealing, despite earlier declarations that it would appeal. The court also denied the government’s attempt to erase the subpoena opinion on mootness grounds. Closure was a prosecutorial decision, not dismissal of an indictment; none had issued.
  16. The closure removed Senator Thom Tillis’s block on Kevin M. Warsh’s confirmation. Warsh became Fed chair in May 2026 after Powell’s chair term ended, while Powell remained a governor. That continuing Board service explains why Trump still sought Powell’s resignation after the chairmanship changed. On September 30, Trump demanded that Powell resign or face a United States government lawsuit for corruption or incompetence. He asked Attorney General Todd Blanche to study the evaluation and determine a response. Trump characterized the project as costing at least 2.5 billion dollars with no end in sight. The exact approved renovation budget was 2.381 billion, and the evaluation did identify a December 2027 construction projection, though not a guaranteed finish. Pirro’s office was reviewing the evaluation. Review is not an announced reopening, and Blanche’s instruction to study it did not bring a case. As of October 1, no public filing established that the investigation had formally reopened, and no new charges were established. That limits what is publicly known; it does not guarantee what prosecutors will decide next.
  17. The Board accepted all seven corrective recommendations. They require negotiating a guaranteed maximum price or identifying another route to best value; establishing cost and schedule success measures; and setting the construction manager’s fee as the contract provides. Governance must assign an oversight body to monitor those measures, clarify responsibility, authority and accountability, and establish reporting to the Board and its relevant oversight committee. The contract’s audit clause should be exercised to validate all awarded costs, including construction, allowances, contingencies, manager fees and savings. Contractor and owner’s-representative requirements must be reconciled with services actually received, with reimbursement assessed for services paid for but not delivered. Future major initiatives need a standardized framework and agency policy, including criteria for oversight committees, documented duties, and senior Board or Federal Reserve System members who do not themselves manage the project.
  18. Warsh retained the General Services Administration as project executive, effective immediately, in his September 29 response. It reports to him and the Board and oversees the remaining work; that is executive and advisory project oversight, not a transfer of Fed ownership. Warsh committed to promptly completing guaranteed-maximum-price negotiations, setting fixed budget and schedule measures with the project executive, and hiring an independent auditor to verify the accuracy and compliance of all awarded costs to date. With GSA, the Board will review contracts, determine the value of services not received, and pursue appropriate remedies, potentially reimbursement or credits. No recovery has yet been established. Warsh committed to systematic implementation and accountability, prudent use of public funds, and efficient, transparent completion. The answer to the opening question is concrete: the price ceiling, independent cost validation and clear managerial accountability were missing. The evaluation produced no grounds for criminal referral and no administrative-misconduct finding. The separate criminal inquiry was closed, with restart reserved, and reviewing this evaluation did not itself reopen it. Whether the Board obtains a real ceiling, validates costs, recovers any amount owed and meets defined completion measures remains unfinished. The inspector general plans quarterly follow-up until all recommendations are addressed. No fixed calendar deadline has been established for completing the independent audit or finalizing the guaranteed maximum price.

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