司法 · 检察改革
韩国拆分检察权,但交接工作尚未完成
这项改革打破了长期存在的调查权与起诉权集中于一处的局面。眼下的考验是:一家启动前有974个职位空缺、没有常任局长、案件移交系统尚未完成的机构,能否胜任工作。
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1 篇报道14 家媒体31 个来源1 个视频
数十年来,韩国的检察制度一直面临一项根本性批评:决定是否提起刑事指控的人同时掌控调查,权力过度集中,批评者称这种权力有时被用于政治目的。2026年10月2日,韩国开始实施一种不同的安排。检察官不再拥有通常的直接调查权。但接手调查特定严重犯罪的机构在没有常任负责人、招聘工作和必要系统尚未完成的情况下启动运作。1 8
严重犯罪调查局和重组后的检察机关取代了原有的检察组织,包括最高检察厅,结束了其78年的历史。两者的成立标志着权力分配发生重大变化,但尚不能证明案件会在如今共同承担责任的各机构之间得到更公正或更高效的处理。2 11
最明显的准备缺口是人员不足。《先驱经济》10月1日报道,调查局计划设置的2,874个职位中,已有1,900个到位。尚缺974人,约占计划编制的33.9%。这是最新的明确启动前数据,并非经过独立更新的启动当日统计。21
关键事实
谁负责调查,谁负责起诉
大体上的分工很明确。新设机构负责调查特定重大犯罪。警方负责普通刑事案件调查,例如袭击和盗窃。检察机关评估证据、决定是否提起公诉,并在法庭上进行公诉。高级公职人员犯罪调查处仍然是调查机构;改革并未赋予新机构对所有严重案件的排他管辖权。现有报道没有明确说明重叠案件的具体处理规则。1 11
实施情况报道指出,该局管辖范围包括六类重大犯罪:腐败、经济犯罪、国防工业犯罪、毒品犯罪、内乱和外敌侵略,以及网络犯罪。此外,报道还提到一项称为“歪曲法律”的罪名,韩文为법왜곡죄。本文无法确认其具体法定构成要件。17
该局还负责对涉及七类弱势群体的犯罪开展补充调查,其中包括虐待儿童和性犯罪。完整类别清单尚不可得。关键在于,这项职能属于调查局,并不能证明检察官拥有永久例外,可以恢复自行直接调查。检察官可以转而要求警方进行补充调查或重新调查。17
不过,对于“所有检察官立即停止所有调查”的说法,存在一项临时性限定。韩联社韩文版报道称,法律允许部分既有调查继续最长90天,其中包括临近诉讼时效期限的6月3日地方选举相关案件。符合条件案件的完整规则以及这段期限的起算点均未得到确认。这是报道所述的过渡条款,并非适用于所有案件的期限、对调查权的永久恢复,也不是对处理延迟的衡量。12
检察官除提起公诉外,仍承担大量职责:执行刑罚、保护受害者、追回犯罪所得,以及代表公共利益。检察机关撤销了42个直接调查部门,并将相关职能改组为29个重大犯罪公诉部门,同时设立部门审查警方不移送案件的决定。42和29统计的是不同职能,并非可直接比较的人员削减数量。14
检察官仍负责申请拘留令;实施情况报道还提到,在提出申请前会讯问嫌疑人。这本身并不能证明检察官拥有不受限制的调查权,或可以亲自执行强制调查措施。这一区别很重要:将调查与公诉分开,并不意味着检察官不再参与审判前每一个会产生重大影响的环节。14
常任负责人缺位下的启动
两家继任机构启动时均没有常任负责人,但有报道称由代理负责人领导。这是严重的领导层缺口,但并不意味着完全没有管理。金志勇(Kim Ji-yong,亦作Kim Jiyong)仍是调查局首任局长提名人。8 19
据10月2日SBS报道,总统李在明于10月1日批准了向国会提出的人事听证会请求。李在明表示,他将在听证会后作出最终任命决定。目前没有明确的听证会或任命日期。批准听证会请求并不等于国会批准任命;现有法律证据也无法确定法律是否要求国会作出肯定的同意表决,或听证会必须得出有利结果。20 30
报道称,执政党强硬派反对金志勇,并对他提出担忧或指控。总统府称,这些指控并不严重到足以剥夺他作出解释的机会。经核实的材料没有具体说明指控的实质内容,也未证实指控属实,或它们是导致延迟的唯一原因。18 23
做好准备不等于已准备就绪
此次启动并非一夜之间仓促作出的行政安排。政府准备材料显示,《政府组织法》修正案于2025年10月通过,继任机构的组织法于2026年3月通过。国会于9月17日通过51项后续法案,并在废除旧机构前修订了126项总统令。这些节点表明前期准备工作相当充分,但不能据此确定法律中精确的生效条款,也不能证明所有运营要求均已完成。13 6 3
行政安全部次官金敏载于8月4日作了准备工作简报;部长尹昊重出席了10月2日在首尔举行的启动仪式和揭牌仪式。行政部门的参与,以及部长推荐金志勇出任局长,都不能替代对两家继任机构法定归属部门和监管权力的核实说明。这些法律细节仍未得到充分确认。13 9 30
更直接的障碍涉及办公场所和计算机。《首尔经济日报》报道称,调查局总部和首尔办事处仍在施工,预计于明年年初完工——即2027年年初,并非确切的合同期限。计算机系统问题妨碍检察机关移交案件,调查局也尚未接入警方的KICS网络。申请令状可能需要提交纸质文件;这只是一种可能,并不意味着所有令状当时都已改为人工处理。29
案件处理延迟已被广泛报道,但现有证据无法提供可信的全国积压案件总数、平均延迟时间、改革前后比较或逾期案件数量。人员空缺和移交问题是具体存在的限制因素,但这些情况不能说明各自造成了多大延迟、改革是否导致了所有现存延迟,或任何个案需要多长时间才能办结。1 29
这一检验尚未完成。常任人事任命、招聘、可靠的案件移交和有效运转的警方系统连接等问题仍未解决。改革改变了权力归属。接下来的责任,是让这种分工切实运作,避免人们的案件滞留在负责调查和公诉的机构之间。
本报道使用的来源
NHK WORLD-JAPAN:改革与启动报道,10月2日。1
韩联社:继任机构开始运作。2
《亚洲经济日报》:修订126项总统令。3
《先驱经济》:人员编制框架及弱势受害者相关职能。4
《亚洲经济日报》:首任局长提名人的任务。5
NOCUTNEWS:通过51项后续法案。6
《亚洲经济日报》:调查与公诉职责。7
《先驱经济》:常任负责人缺位下的启动。8
韩联社:启动仪式照片。9
SBS:继任机构启动。10
《韩国时报》:历经78年后废除。11
韩联社韩文版:过渡安排及延续调查。12
政府政策简报:调查局筹备工作。13
《金融新闻》:检察机关部门与职能。14
韩联社:内阁于8月批准调查权修订案。15
《金融新闻》:调查局启动与准备情况。16
《金融新闻》:调查管辖权与程序调整。17
《亚洲经济日报》:批准听证会请求。18
《先驱经济》:金志勇对提名的表态。19
SBS:人事听证会请求。20
《先驱经济》:启动前人员编制及高级职位。21
韩联社:局长提名人照片。22
《亚洲经济日报》:总统对金志勇任命的处理方式。23
SBS:领导职位空缺及总统府立场。24
《首尔经济日报》:局长提名人关于改革的承诺。25
《韩国先驱报》:国会听证会请求。26
《韩国中央日报》:启动及准备工作缺口。27
韩联社:要求举行提名人听证会。28
《首尔经济日报》:办公场所、系统及高级职位。29
NewsPim:李在明关于听证会后作出任命决定的表态。30
CHOSUNBIZ:全钟民在启动仪式上的致辞。31
播出原貌 20 行
- South Korea has stripped prosecutors of their ordinary power to investigate crimes themselves.
- The agency taking over serious-crime investigations opened without a permanent chief. Its latest pre-launch staffing count leaves 974 planned positions vacant, while computer problems hamper case transfers.
- Can the new system move serious cases to court while its staffing, leadership and infrastructure remain unfinished?
- The staffing gap amounts to roughly one-third of the investigation agency’s intended workforce. Of 2,874 planned positions, 1,900 were filled in the October 1 count: approximately 66.1 percent staffed and 33.9 percent vacant. Those exact figures support the rounded description of an agency about two-thirds staffed. They are not a fresh opening-day personnel tally. No independently updated count establishes how many additional employees, if any, arrived by launch. The recruitment framework envisages police personnel and lawyers filling remaining posts, but there is no verified deadline for reaching full strength.
- The two successor institutions began operating on October 2, 2026. The Serious Crime Investigation Agency and the restructured Prosecution Service replaced the former prosecutors’ organization, including the Supreme Prosecutors’ Office, after 78 years. The operational launch is established; the precise statutory commencement clause is not.
- Police still investigate ordinary crimes such as assaults and thefts. The new agency investigates specified major offenses, while prosecutors assess the resulting evidence, decide whether to bring charges and prosecute in court. Prosecutors have also lost their own direct supplementary-investigation power. They can request supplementary investigation or reinvestigation by police instead. The Corruption Investigation Office for High-ranking Officials remains part of the investigative system, too. This is not a transfer of every serious case exclusively to the new agency: the precise rules for allocating overlapping cases remain unestablished.
- The agency’s remit includes six major-crime categories: corruption, economic crime, defense-industry crime, drug crime, insurrection and foreign aggression, and cybercrime. It also includes an offense described as distortion of the law, called 법왜곡죄 in Korean. Its exact statutory elements are not established.
- Supplementary investigations involving seven categories of crimes against vulnerable people also belong to the investigation agency. These include child abuse and sexual offenses, although the complete seven-category list is unavailable. That responsibility does not establish a permanent exception allowing prosecutors to resume direct investigations themselves.
- Some investigations already underway may nevertheless continue for up to 90 days under a temporary transition provision. These include cases concerning the June 3 local elections that were approaching limitation deadlines. The complete eligibility rules and the period’s starting point are not established, so 90 days cannot be treated as a universal deadline for every outstanding case. Nor is it a measured case-processing delay. It is a limited carryover allowance, not a permanent restoration of prosecutors’ general investigative authority.
- The prosecution service removed 42 direct-investigation departments and converted functions into 29 major-crime prosecution departments. Those numbers describe different organizational functions, not a like-for-like staffing cut. New departments will review police decisions not to refer cases for prosecution. Prosecutors also retain responsibilities for sentence enforcement, victim protection, recovery of criminal proceeds and public-interest representation. They retain a role in seeking detention warrants, including suspect interviews before such requests. That warrant role does not establish unrestricted investigative power or authority to personally execute compulsory investigative measures.
- The reform separates powers that prosecutors previously held together. The National Assembly approved it after decades of criticism that prosecutors exercised excessive authority and sometimes used it for political purposes. Legal experts disagree over whether removing their investigative authority is warranted. Institutional separation addresses that concentration of power; it does not prove that political interference has ended, or that the replacement system will automatically be fairer or faster.
- The launch followed 51 follow-up bills and revisions to 126 presidential decrees. The bills passed on September 17; the decree revisions preceded abolition of the old organization. The Government Organization Act had been amended in October 2025, followed by laws governing the successor institutions in March 2026. Interior and Safety Vice Minister Kim Min-jae delivered an August 4 preparation briefing. Minister Yun Ho-jung attended the October 2 launch ceremony and plaque unveiling in Seoul. Those milestones establish substantial preparation and administrative involvement, not that every operational requirement was ready.
- Both new institutions opened without permanent chiefs, although acting leadership was in place. That is a leadership gap, not an absence of all management.
- Kim Ji-yong remains the nominee for the investigation agency’s inaugural chief. President Lee Jae-myung approved a request for a parliamentary confirmation hearing on October 1 and reserved his final appointment decision until after that hearing. Approval of the hearing request is not parliamentary approval of the appointment. Whether an affirmative Assembly consent vote or a favorable hearing outcome is legally required remains unresolved. There is no established hearing or appointment date. Kim faces opposition from ruling-party hardliners and concerns or allegations whose underlying substance is not specified in the verified material. Their truth, and whether they alone caused the delay, are not established.
- Jeon Jong-min is the agency’s deputy chief or vice administrator and delivered launch remarks. He is not expressly established as its acting chief. Choi Jae-min was selected to head the Seoul office, not the whole agency. The identities of the acting heads of both institutions are not conclusively established in those capacities.
- The Interior and Safety minister recommended Kim, but that recommendation and the ministry’s preparation work do not settle the agency’s statutory oversight arrangements. The precise legal placement and ministerial powers governing both successor institutions, including their Interior and Safety and Justice leadership lines, remain incompletely established. Different English translations of the investigation agency’s name do not mean additional successor agencies exist.
- Computer-system problems are hampering transfers of prosecution cases, and a connection to the police KICS network has not yet been established. Warrants might have to be filed on paper; that is a possibility, not proof that every warrant is already processed manually. Construction at the agency headquarters and Seoul office is continuing, with completion described as early 2027 rather than an exact contractual deadline. The extent of unfinished work, specific software defects and number of affected cases are not established.
- Case-processing delays have been widely reported, but there is no defensible national backlog total, average delay, before-and-after comparison or count of overdue cases. The vacancies and transfer problems are concrete constraints. They do not establish how much delay each caused, whether the reform caused all existing delays, or how long an individual case will take.
- For people reporting child abuse, sexual offenses, corruption or financial wrongdoing, a formally open agency is not the same as an investigation progressing. Suspects also have a stake in how quickly allegations can be tested rather than left unresolved. No verified account establishes that a particular case was lost or a specific victim denied protection because of these launch gaps.
- The answer to whether this system can move serious cases forward is not yet established: the division of responsibilities is operational, but its effect on case-processing times remains unmeasured. Permanent appointments, recruitment, reliable case transfers and a working police-system link remain unfinished. There is no confirmed hearing date, full-staffing deadline or exact infrastructure-completion date.
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