报道
瑞士中立公投检验制裁与军事关系的界限
一项拟议的宪法规则将把对侵略者实施制裁与联合国决定挂钩,并限制军事关系。投票前的一项民调显示反对者领先,但尚无结果得到确认。
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1 篇报道20 家媒体37 个来源1 个视频
瑞士围绕中立的争论并非始于投票箱。2022年2月,俄罗斯入侵乌克兰后,瑞士采取欧盟对俄制裁措施,争论由此加剧。瑞士政府表示,捍卫国际法与中立立场并不矛盾。支持这项宪法倡议的人士则称,这一决定损害了瑞士作为调解方所凭借的公正性和公信力。9月27日,选民将被要求决定,面对国外的侵略时,哪一种对中立的理解应当指导国家的应对。 3318
中立倡议将把更严格的中立理解确立为宪法约束。按照FRANCE 24对该提案的描述,只有在联合国决定实施制裁时,瑞士才能对侵略国实施制裁。除非瑞士本身遭到攻击,否则瑞士也不得加入北约等军事联盟。路透社报道了另一项后果:和平时期与北约的合作将终止,而不仅仅是禁止加入北约。经核对的节选没有刊载拟议条文全文,因此无法确切确定哪些合作会被禁止,也无法确定哪种联合国决定符合制裁条件。 1136
这一区别很重要。限制加入军事联盟的规则,会限制瑞士在未来危机中可能作出的一项选择。有关制裁的规则,则关系到瑞士已经作出的选择。这项倡议并非只是宣称瑞士应当远离战争;它还在追问,在等待国际社会达成共识之前,瑞士应保留多少惩罚侵略者的自由。
对俄制裁让利害关系具体呈现
日内瓦的活动人士正呼吁选民将他们所称的绝对中立写入宪法。他们认为,瑞士对俄实施制裁损害了其公正性,也损害了瑞士作为外交活动场所的地位。日内瓦的国际角色让这一担忧成为有力的政治论点,但这并不能证明瑞士已经失去调解能力。前政府部长克里斯托夫·布洛赫尔与这项倡议有关联,不过经核对的报道没有确认他是否拥有正式的竞选活动职务。 113
瑞士联邦委员会和议会反对这项倡议,主张保留现行做法。对他们而言,政府2022年的决定表明,中立并不意味着在违反国际法时袖手旁观。反对者称,若以联合国行动作为实施制裁的条件,同时进一步限制军事合作,瑞士在自身安全或更广泛的国际秩序受到威胁时,将更难作出回应。选民权衡的另一种风险正是如此:不是行动损害公正性,而是克制使可用选项减少。 111
一名接受FRANCE 24采访的反对者警告说,如果瑞士制裁俄罗斯的能力减弱,瑞士可能成为俄罗斯寡头以及直接参与其战争行动人员的避风港。这是对拟议规则可能带来何种后果的预测,并不意味着这样的避风港已经存在,也不意味着这项倡议已经通过。这一警告把争论从宪法原则带回了制裁旨在针对的人群。 1
中立一词并非任何一方的专属。支持者希望保护瑞士作为敌对各方会晤场所的声誉;反对者则希望保留在无需先取得联合国决定的情况下对入侵采取行动的能力。这次投票将决定哪一种风险在宪法层面更为重要,但不会为瑞士未来何时应运用其保留的权力作出所有判断。
民调不等于裁决
NPR于9月25日报道,瑞士将在那个周末就是否让其历史性的中立立场具有更强法律约束力举行投票。联邦投票信息将2026年9月27日星期日列为公投日期。然而,官方投票仪表板的一段摘录将详情页面标注为9月26日。造成这一差异的原因尚未得到确认,该页面也没有提供任何已计票结果。 2364
关键事实
9月16日的SRG民调显示,投票前反对者大幅领先。但这些百分比反映的是受访者对民调员所作的回答,而不是投票结果。宪法倡议需要同时获得选民和各州的多数支持;全国民意调查无法确认其中任何一种结果。经核对的材料没有确立任何已计票的赞成或反对票总数、投票率或各州票数。 28164
未知
- 尚无已计票结果或各州票数得到确认。
后续
- 该提案能否同时获得所需的两种多数。
目前,诚实的结论应当着眼于这项选择,而非投票结果。瑞士正在决定,保护其公正立场的主张,究竟是通过更严格地约束未来政府更为有效,还是这种约束会让瑞士在另一国家遭到攻击时难以发挥中立作用。对俄制裁说明了这一问题为何真实存在。只有投票结果才能表明哪一种答案将成为法律。
播出原貌 8 行
- Swiss voters are deciding whether to bar sanctions on aggressors without a United Nations decision. The choice could narrow Switzerland’s response to wars abroad and change its relationship with military alliances. But has the proposal won the voter and cantonal majorities it needs to become law?
- The Neutrality Initiative would put a stricter interpretation of Switzerland’s long-standing neutrality into its constitution. Under the proposal as described, Switzerland could impose sanctions on an aggressor country only if the United Nations decides to impose them. It could not join a military alliance such as NATO unless Switzerland itself were attacked.
- The implications extend beyond formal alliance membership: reporting also describes an end to peacetime cooperation with NATO. The checked material does not reproduce the full proposed constitutional article. It does not establish exactly which kinds of cooperation would be barred, or which United Nations body or decision would satisfy the sanctions exception.
- Russia sanctions are the immediate test of that principle. Switzerland adopted European Union sanctions against Russia in February 2022, after Russia invaded Ukraine. The Swiss government maintained that defending international law in this way was compatible with neutrality. The initiative’s supporters see that choice differently: they say joining the sanctions damaged Switzerland’s impartiality and its credibility as a mediator.
- Geneva’s international role is part of the supporters’ case for what they call absolute neutrality. Their argument is about protecting Switzerland’s standing as a diplomatic venue; it does not establish that mediation work has already been lost. Former government minister Christoph Blocher is associated with the initiative, though the checked material does not establish a formal campaign title for him.
- The Federal Council and Parliament oppose putting this stricter rule in the constitution. They favour retaining the existing approach. Opponents argue that waiting on United Nations action before sanctioning an aggressor, and sharply limiting military cooperation, would leave Switzerland with less room to respond to a security crisis or a breach of international law. One opponent warns that a reduced ability to sanction Russia could make Switzerland a safe haven for Russian oligarchs and people directly involved in its war effort. That is a warning about what passage might enable, not an established condition.
- Before the vote, a September 16 opinion survey found 63 percent opposed and 34 percent in favour. Those are views expressed to a pollster, not counted ballots. Even a clear lead in a survey cannot settle a constitutional initiative, which needs majorities among both voters and cantons.
- The federal voting booklet and statistical schedule identify September 27, 2026, as the vote date. An official results-dashboard excerpt instead labels a details page September 26; the reason for that discrepancy is unresolved, and the excerpt provides no result. There is no established counted yes-or-no total, turnout or cantonal tally. Whether the initiative has secured either required majority remains unknown.
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