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冲突 · “林肯”号返航持续报道 · 第 5 篇，共 6 篇

“林肯”号即将结束321天部署返航，获颁作战嘉奖，但人员福祉问题仍待解答

赫格塞思表彰了“林肯”号的作战服役表现，并承认曾两次延长其任务期限。整个打击群发生的8起自杀未遂事件，留下了这项嘉奖无法回答的问题。

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持续报道第 55 天

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4 天无进展5 天无进展14 天无进展7 天无进展
  • 暂无标注日期的事件
  1. 第 1 次更新未停靠港口250天：家属称“林肯”号水兵曾试图跳海
  2. 第 2 次更新伊朗战争令舰队承压，美国调走太平洋最后一艘航母接替林肯号
  3. 第 3 次更新海上272天：林肯号结束在伊朗附近9个月部署，踏上归途
  4. 第 4 次更新“亚伯拉罕·林肯”号结束273天部署，海上航行9个月
  5. 第 5 次更新“林肯”号即将结束321天部署返航，获颁作战嘉奖，但人员福祉问题仍待解答当前位置
  6. 第 6 次更新“林肯”号已经回家。对其舰员福利状况的调查尚未结束。较新

自上次报道以来的变化

47 天后

当时

“亚伯拉罕·林肯”号结束273天部署，海上航行9个月

当时尚无定论

  • 没有所提供的来源能够解释272天、接近300天和在某一作战区域内200天这几种说法之间的差异。
  • 没有所提供的来源证实跳海事件、出动总数或弹药消耗总量。

我们说过将关注的

  • 9月初泰国停靠是否成行，以及这次停靠能否让船员在返回圣迭戈前恢复状态。

现在

赫格塞思表彰了“林肯”号的作战服役表现，并承认曾两次延长其任务期限。整个打击群发生的8起自杀未遂事件，留下了这项嘉奖无法回答的问题。

现已确认

  • 赫格塞思承认两次延期；海军披露8起未遂事件；加列戈要求进行两项独立审查。

“亚伯拉罕·林肯”号航母打击群即将返航，并获颁美军最高级别的单位英勇奖项；与此同时，官方披露其部署期间发生了8起自杀未遂事件。国防部长皮特·赫格塞思于2026年10月7日在航母上表彰了该打击群的作战服役表现。同一天，参议员鲁本·加列戈要求对这项长达321天的任务背后的决策和条件进行独立审查。对水兵所取得成就的认可，并不能说明他们受到的待遇是否妥当。14 83 18

“林肯”号预计将于10月8日抵达圣迭戈的北岛海军航空站。截至10月7日的报道截稿时，该舰尚未靠岸。赫格塞思登舰致欢迎辞是在返航前举行的仪式，并不表明航母已经靠岸。38 40 121

关键事实

  1. 321天按计划返航时的部署时长 121
  2. 8披露的整个打击群自杀未遂事件数 83
  3. 2赫格塞思承认的部署延期次数 85

本文更新了我们8月的报道。8月19日，HeyDay News报道了相关情况：在海上部署268天，约有5,000名水兵和海军陆战队员，连续200多天未停靠港口，且中东局势压力日增。8月21日，我们报道“林肯”号正返航，此时部署约273天；预计“乔治·华盛顿”号接替后，航程还需4至5周。这是关于返航进程的报道，并不意味着已经完成返航。

按计划于10月返航，取代了此前的预测。航程中途停靠了泰国和关岛。无论8月19日是否为确切的在站接替日期，还是8月22日是否为“林肯”号离开中央司令部辖区的日期，都尚未得到确认，因此不应将这些日期视为已确认的航行节点。93 46

一次漫长部署，不同的计时方式

“林肯”号于2025年11月21日离开圣迭戈。其321天部署时长包括停靠港口的时间，并不意味着321天从未靠港。该舰于9月2日抵达泰国林查班，9月6日离港——这是此次部署期间首次完整或常规的港口访问。此后，该舰于9月19日至20日停靠关岛阿普拉港，以获得后勤支持并在基地内休假，但这并非一次常规的、充分休假性质的港口访问。121 93 94 46

USNI News按航母此前于2025年12月11日停靠关岛至抵达泰国之间计算出265天。这一间隔按实际经过天数计算约为264天，若首尾日期均计入则为265天。美国驻泰国使馆和海军所称抵泰时“在海上286天”，对应的是从11月起算的部署日历时长。这是不同的计时方式，不能互换作为受限制行动的衡量标准。91 93

《星条旗报》还报道称，该舰抵达泰国时已连续在海上208天，并在战区服役200天。这些较窄范围数据的起止界限，尚未证实与12月至9月之间的港口停靠间隔相同。这里必须准确区分：任务时长、战区服役时间和两次上岸机会之间的时间，衡量的是水兵及其家人所承受的不同负担。90

赫格塞思最明确地承认了延长任务的责任。

“我就是两次在命令簿上签字、延长你们任务期限的人”，随后他说：“我认罪。”

皮特·赫格塞思 85

他承认，执行任务和补给并不容易。但指出谁签署了命令只是厘清责任的开端：这并未解释考虑过哪些替代方案、评估过哪些风险，也未说明延长期限期间提供了哪些支持。16 85

这项奖项能够——以及不能够——说明什么

总统单位嘉奖表彰的是“亚伯拉罕·林肯”号航母打击群，包括航母、第9舰载机联队及随行舰艇。该打击群的行动数据不应全都归于“林肯”号。护航舰之一“弗兰克·E·彼得森二世”号已于9月28日返回夏威夷。14

嘉奖称，该打击群执行了3,693次作战出动，投放了1.37 million磅弹药，发射了450枚“战斧”对陆攻击巡航导弹，并击沉64艘伊朗军舰。嘉奖还称，防御力量击落77架单向攻击无人机、摧毁21枚反舰巡航导弹，并抵御了4艘快速攻击艇和载有爆炸物的船只（被称为单桅帆船）。最后这一数字并非经核实的额外击沉数量。这些是官方嘉奖所列的说法，并非经过独立审计的结果。12 50

嘉奖词称：“在伊朗方向开展了40天作战行动，并实施了铁壁般的海上封锁，以支持‘史诗怒火行动’。”官方说法将自2月28日起连续40天的作战行动，与随后持续数月的封锁区分开来。C-SPAN报道的嘉奖时间段为2月28日至8月22日，但8月22日这一截止日期尚未得到独立佐证。不得将40个作战日扩大解释为整个日历时段。12 72 1

这项嘉奖没有提供经独立确认的伊朗损失清单，也没有评估平民伤亡。其醒目的数字描述了获认可的作战规模，并未完整核算任务造成的后果。

披露8起未遂事件，另6起情况仍未说明

这项有关人员福祉的披露来自代理海军部长洪·曹——更正最初写作“Hung Kao”的拼写——他于9月22日致信参议员克尔斯滕·吉利布兰德。她的办公室于9月24日公布了信件。曹写道，自部署开始以来，“整个打击群共发生8起自杀未遂事件”。统计范围包括“林肯”号船员、舰载机联队、打击群和驱逐舰中队参谋人员、护航驱逐舰以及随舰航空中队。55 83

上述措辞统计的是未遂事件，并不一定意味着有8名不同人员。它并未证实所有事件都发生在“林肯”号上，也未指明涉及的每艘舰艇，或排除同一人员多次尝试的可能。信中称，没有军人死于自杀。无论是这些未遂事件，还是没有自杀死亡，都不应与赫格塞思另行提出的作战伤亡说法混为一谈。83 56

信中描述了两起事件。3月，舰上同袍及时介入，一名水兵立即接受医疗救治，随后被送回母港。8月初，一名舰载机联队水兵由搜救直升机救起，接受“林肯”号医疗部门治疗，随后转离舰艇接受后续治疗。其余6起未遂事件没有详细说明；相关日期、地点和后续临床结果仍未公开，尚不清楚。没有证据确认每起未遂事件的医学原因，也没有证据表明部署时长本身导致了这些事件。83 60

信中列出了5名随军牧师、1名随舰综合预防顾问、1名心理学家、1名临床社工、3名行为健康技术员和1只远征设施犬。人员配置清单只能说明列出了哪些资源，不能证明服务能力是否充足、是否能在需要时获得帮助，或每项求助是否都得到回应。60

此前，赫格塞思称有关人员福祉的报道“完全失实”，曹则质疑部分报道的真实性。随后海军披露的信息，使得更难以将此事一笔带过：维护任务正当性与说明人员照护情况是两项独立责任。16 6

现在的检验在于独立审查

加列戈于10月7日致信国防部监察长普拉特·B·莫林三世，要求审查任务规划和两次延期、有关食物及基本物资短缺的报道、补给安排、持续疲劳、领导层应对措施以及心理健康服务的获取情况。他特别要求审查是否有水兵请求照护却未能获得服务、相关政策是否充分，以及是否存在需要追责的不合规行为或系统性缺陷。物资短缺和照护不足是他要求调查的问题，并非监察长已经确认的调查结论。84 18

在另致代理审计长奥丽丝·W·布朗的信中，加列戈要求政府问责局审查海军能否安全、有效地维持延长部署。他要求制定可衡量的限制标准，涵盖部署时长、船员休息、停靠港口频率、后勤储备、心理健康服务能力、维护和部署后恢复。此类措施所要考量的，不只是打击群能够完成什么任务，还包括怎样才能在不耗尽人员和系统的情况下持续完成任务。2

已知

  • 赫格塞思承认两次延期；海军披露8起未遂事件；加列戈要求进行两项独立审查。 858318

未知

  • 尚未确认有任何机构接受请求、作出回应或确定报告截止日期。每一位需要帮助的水兵是否都获得了帮助，仍无定论。

后续

  • 确认10月8日的抵达时间，然后关注独立审查人员是否取得有关延期、补给和照护的记录，并制定可持续部署标准。

返航将结束船员与家乡的即时分离，但仅凭返航本身，并不能证明治疗、恢复或问责已经完成。水兵既配得上这项嘉奖，也有权得到答复。两者并不矛盾。

播出原貌 35 行
  1. On August 21 we reported Lincoln heading home. Its scheduled return now follows 321 deployment days. Eight suicide attempts across the strike group have put crew welfare at the center of demands for independent review.
  2. What is established about those extensions, and what remains unanswered about the crew's supplies, rest and care?
  3. The USS Abraham Lincoln is due at Naval Air Station North Island in San Diego on October 8. At the October 7 reporting cutoff, it had not arrived alongside. Welcoming sailors aboard the ship did not establish a completed homecoming.
  4. Our August 21 account described roughly 273 deployment days and a projected four-to-five-week voyage after an expected relief by USS George Washington. The actual journey, including stops in Thailand and Guam, has overtaken that projection.
  5. On August 19, we reported 268 days at sea, approximately 5,000 sailors and Marines, and more than 200 consecutive days without a port call. Those were the accounts then, not today's final duration or a confirmed arrival.
  6. The exact August 19 on-station relief date and an August 22 departure from the Central Command area are not established. Neither should become a confirmed transit milestone simply because it appeared in an earlier account.
  7. Lincoln reached Laem Chabang in Thailand on September 2 and departed September 6. That was its first full or regular port visit of the deployment. A September 19–20 stop at Apra Harbor in Guam provided logistics support and on-base liberty.
  8. The Guam visit, around deployment day 302, was not a regular full-liberty port call. Escorts also visited Thailand: USS Frank E. Petersen Jr. went to Sriracha, and USS Robert Smalls to Map Ta Phut. Petersen returned to Hawaii on September 28.
  9. Lincoln departed San Diego on November 21, 2025. The 321-day deployment includes port visits. The gap from its December 11 Guam stop to Thailand was roughly 264 elapsed days, or 265 with inclusive counting—not another deployment.
  10. The 286-day description at Thailand tracks the deployment calendar span. Another account used 208 consecutive days at sea and 200 days in a combat zone. Its boundaries are not established as equivalent to the longer December-to-September port-call gap.
  11. Mission length and the intervals between shore opportunities measure different burdens on sailors and families. Neither a deployment total nor a combat-zone count, by itself, tells us whether rest and support were adequate.
  12. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth acknowledged signing two extensions when he boarded Lincoln on October 7. He also acknowledged that the mission and resupply were not easy. Those decisions are now among the subjects proposed for independent scrutiny.
  13. Hegseth presented the Presidential Unit Citation, the military's highest unit-level award for valor in battle. It recognizes the Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group, including the carrier, Carrier Air Wing 9 and accompanying ships—not every action by the carrier alone.
  14. The citation credits the group with 3,693 combat sorties, delivery of 1.37 million pounds of ordnance, launch of 450 Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles and sinking 64 Iranian warships. These are official claims, not independently audited operational results.
  15. The award does not provide an independently established inventory of Iranian losses or a civilian casualty assessment. Its figures describe the credited scale of the mission, not a complete accounting of its consequences.
  16. The award also credits defenses with shooting down 77 one-way attack drones, destroying 21 anti-ship cruise missiles and defending against four fast-attack craft or explosive-carrying ships described as dhows. Four is not an additional independently verified count of ships sunk.
  17. Forty straight combat days began February 28, followed by a monthslong blockade. February 28 is established as the start of U.S. combat alongside Israel. The reported February 28–August 22 award interval is not a forty-day calendar span.
  18. The August 22 citation endpoint has not been independently corroborated. It must not become either a verified operational end date or proof that all the months between February and August were counted as forty combat days.
  19. Hegseth characterized the mission as preventing Iran's leaders from ever getting a nuclear weapon. That does not establish that Iran's future nuclear capability has been permanently eliminated. He called families' long wait service to a righteous and historic mission.
  20. Hegseth attacked efforts to portray the deployment as dysfunction, low morale or failure. Earlier, he had called welfare reporting completely misrepresented, while Acting Navy Secretary Hung Cao challenged some reporting's honesty. The subsequent disclosure requires a separate accounting of personnel welfare.
  21. Hegseth also claimed no casualties during combat operations and no aircraft mishaps. That combat claim does not describe the crew's entire health experience. Suicide attempts do not themselves establish combat deaths, and an absence of combat casualties does not erase them.
  22. Eight attempts were disclosed across the strike group, not just aboard Lincoln. Hung Cao—the correct name, not Hung Kao—wrote to Senator Kirsten Gillibrand on September 22. Her office published the letter and excerpts September 24. No service members died by suicide.
  23. The count includes the crew, air wing, strike-group and destroyer-squadron staffs, escorting destroyers and embarked aviation squadrons. It does not identify every ship or establish that all attempts happened aboard Lincoln. Nor does it rule out repeat events involving one person.
  24. In March, shipmates intervened in one attempt; the sailor received immediate medical care and returned to homeport. In early August, an air-wing sailor was recovered by helicopter, treated by Lincoln's medical department and transferred off the ship for follow-up care.
  25. The other six attempts were not detailed. Their dates, locations and subsequent clinical outcomes remain publicly unclear. The disclosure establishes neither a medical cause for each attempt nor that deployment length alone caused it.
  26. The listed support included five chaplains, an embedded integrated prevention counselor, a psychologist, a clinical social worker, three behavioral health technicians and an expeditionary facility dog. That establishes the resources listed—not whether every sailor could get care when needed.
  27. The staffing figures do not establish whether capacity was sufficient for the population, support was available at the necessary time, or every request was met. Whether anyone sought help and failed to receive it remains a central unanswered question.
  28. Gillibrand's October 7 response was that the sailors deserve better than a photo-op. Their return would end the immediate separation from home. It would not establish that recovery, treatment or accountability is complete.
  29. Senator Ruben Gallego requested two independent reviews on October 7. One asks Defense Department Inspector General Platte B. Moring III to investigate planning, the two extensions, reported food and basic-supply shortages, resupply arrangements, sustained fatigue and leadership responses.
  30. Gallego also sought scrutiny of mental-health access, including whether a sailor asked for care and did not receive it. He asked whether policies were adequate and whether noncompliance or systemic deficiencies warranted accountability. These are requested investigations, not inspector-general findings.
  31. The request was copied to Naval Inspector General Vice Admiral M. Wayne Baze and Cao. In a separate letter to Acting Comptroller General Orice W. Brown, Gallego asked the Government Accountability Office to assess safe, effective sustainment of extended deployments.
  32. The proposed standards cover deployment duration, crew rest, port-call frequency, logistics reserves, mental-health capacity, maintenance and post-deployment recovery. The broader review would examine logistics, maintenance, welfare, readiness and retention—not merely how much firepower a strike group can deliver.
  33. A separate dispute over Senator Chris Murphy's denied military access concerns Al Udeid in Qatar, not a Lincoln oversight visit. The Pentagon said support was denied in advance under Hegseth's regional travel directive and that the guidance was applied evenly.
  34. The answer is that two extensions are acknowledged and eight attempts are officially disclosed. Whether supplies, rest and care met the crew's needs remains unresolved. Neither review request establishes that an investigation has opened or an agency has accepted it.
  35. No agency response or firm report date is confirmed. A November 20 response deadline is not sufficiently corroborated and cannot be presented as a promised delivery date. Lincoln's next scheduled event remains the October 8 pier arrival at North Island.

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